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C r i t iq u e

ABSTRACT

Policy Analysis: Evaluating Theories
of the Hermeneutic Critique
by
Cecilea Mun

Dr. Craig Walton, Examination Committee Chair
Emeritus Professor of Ethics and Policy Studies
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This thesis evaluates three theories representing the three perspectives identified by
Goktug Morçôl as perspectives of the hermeneutic critique in policy analysis, while
explicating the revolutionary process that the science is currently undergoing. The
evaluation is focused around the question as to whether the three theories are viable
alternatives to positivist theories. First, a brief history of policy analysis is presented,
highlighting the conditions that contributed to the rise of the general positivist paradigm
as the ideal in policy analysis. This is followed by a summary and criticisms of the
general positivist paradigm. Next, summaries of Dvora Yanow’s interpretive theory,
Deborah Stone’s policy analysis as craft theory, and Frank Fischer’s discursive theory are
presented as representatives of the three perspectives within the hermeneutic critique.
Finally, an evaluation is offered of the three theories based on their ability to overcome
the challenges presented by the criticisms of the general positivist paradigm.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
Brief History of Policy Analysis
Policy analysis in a broad sense is “a form of applied research carried out to acquire a
deeper understanding of sociotechnical issues and to bring about better solutions.”' The
history of policy analysis traces back to ancient times.^ According to Stuart Nagel, “one
can find implicit policy analysis in the legal rules of Babylonians, the ancient Hebrews,
and the Egyptians, as well as in written and unwritten legal systems of ancient groups in
Asia, Latin America, and Africa.”^ Since then, policy analysis has evolved in various
ways. Its evolution has been a product of philosophical, historical, political, and social
influences. It has been influenced by political philosophers since the Renaissance, and
nineteenth and twentieth century political and social thinkers, leaders and philosophers."'
In the early twentieth century, policy analysis began to develop professional identities
apart from that of political philosophy and sociology. Harold Lasswell was especially
influential in the evolution of policy analysis. Deemed “The Modem Day Founder of

’ E.S. Quade, Analysis fo r Public Decisions, 2d ed. (New York: Elsevier Science
Publishing Co., Inc., 1982), 5.
^ Stuart S. Nagel, Policy Studies: Integration and Evaluation, (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1988).
^ Ibid., 214.
^ Ibid., 214-215.
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Policy Science,” policy analysis as envisioned by Lasswell can be understood as the seed
of contemporary policy analysis/ Lasswell presented a sweeping vision of policy
sciences that at the same time sparked development in the new field and led to the
stereotyping o f his ideas as utopian/
According to Lasswell’s vision, “the policy sciences would be eoneemed with the
‘fundamental problems of man in society’ (Lemer and Lasswell, 1951:8)” and “[they]
were to break from the past.”’ According to Garson, “Lasswell defined the policy
scientist as one who was concerned with mastering the skills appropriate to enlightened
decision in the context of public and civic order. In this definition, skills became
emphasized in the field of policy analysis. Context -historical, cross-cultural, multi
method—represented a deep commitment in Lasswell’s concept of policy science, but
one which was obscured by sweeping projections of empirical skills.”^ Thus, Lasswell’s
single vision of policy analysis, in that it realized both humanistic and behavioralistic
assumptions, can be understood as the point before the theoretical divide in policy
analysis—the division between synoptic and anti-synoptic, positivist and postpositivist,
or, as defined by Frank Fischer, empiricist and postempiricist approaches. ^

^ ‘Policy science’ has often been used to refer to positivist policy analysis. The term
‘technocratic policy analysis’ has also been used this way.
^ G. David Garson, “From Policy Science to Policy Analysis,” ed. W. Dunn, Policy
Analysis: Perspectives, Concepts, and Methods (Greenwich, CT: Jai Press Inc., 1986).
’ Ibid., 6.
®Ibid., 7.
^ Frank Fischer, Reframing Public Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Inc.,
2003) 1-16. By permission of Oxford University Press.
2
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Since Lasswell’s time, policy analysis, as a field of study and profession, enjoyed
tremendous growth. This growth was attributed by Nagel to three factors: “(1) the
intense eoneem with policy problems in the late 1960s; (2) the development of new
analytic and interdisciplinary methods that could be applied to evaluating alternative
policies; and (3) the increasing attractiveness of government as an employer and research
sponsor in the eyes of the contracting academic community.”'*' In the following passage,
Nagel further illustrates the influence of these three factors to the growth of
contemporary policy analysis in general:
The general growth in policy studies which began about 1971 had been stimulated
by what may be regarded as pushing, enabling, and pulling factors. The pushing
factors, or social forces, included the intense concern as of 1970 for policy
problems in the areas of civil rights, poverty, Vietnam, women’s liberation, and
environmental protection. In the later 1970s the public shifted to an increased,
and still quite intense, concern about inflation, energy, productivity, and the
Middle East. Before the social sciences could convert such pushing factors into
meaningful policy analysis products, they needed better methods, interdisciplinary
relations, data banks, and data processing equipment, which have been developed
over the last twenty years. Policy Analysis has also been stimulated by the
increased attractiveness, or pull, of government as a source of research funding
and job opportunities as well as by government’s increased concern for deriving
greater output from reduced tax dollars."
Although policy analysis in general (field, theory, and practice) grew much more than
it had in the past during these times, and its importance to society and government was
being realized to a greater extent, this growth was primarily focused around the positivist
or, as Garson refers to it, the synoptic tradition. According to Garson, three powerful
forces supported the synoptic tradition. As Garson explains, “First, it rode on the crest of

Stuart Nagel, Contemporary Public Policy Analysis (University, AL: The
University o f Alabama Press, 1984), xiii.
" Ibid., 13.
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behavioral revolution in the political and social sciences, with its interdisciplinary
emphasis, focus on quantitative precision, and goal of systematic empirical theory (See
Ranney, ed., 1962). Second, it retained some of the mantle of legitimacy of the vision of
service to national planning conferred on it by Lasswell, Merriam, and others...[and
third,] the social ferment of the 1960s led to intense criticism of the pluralist
alternative.”'^ Thus, given these powerful forces and those factors that contributed to the
growth of policy analysis in general, the synoptic tradition—positivist or empiricist
approaches to policy analysis—became realized as the ideal model for policy analysis.'^
Brian Fay also notes two historical factors regarding the evolution of positivist policy
analysis.'"' First, Fay discusses the historical context in which the factors and forces
mentioned by Garson and Nagel are to have led to the growth of positivist policy

Garson, 10. By ‘pluralist alternatives’ Garson is referring to the ‘anti-synoptic
tradition.’ And, according to Anne Larason Schneider and Hellen Ingram, “The
appropriate role of government in society, according to pluralist theories, is to produce
public policies that represent interests of the electorate, resolve conflicts, reflect
reasonable compromises among competing perspectives, and ensure the continued
stability of the collectivity along with its preferred economic cultural characteristics”
{Policy Design fo r Democracy, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1997, 13).
Used with permission of Kansas University Press and coauthor Helen Ingram.
As Schneider and Ingram further note, such authors as Ted Lowi offered the kind of
intense criticisms referred to by Garson in the above passage. They explain how “During
three decades of writing Lowi has argued that the competition among interest groups that
pluralist theory holds as a necessary feature of democracy does not exist in the United
States. Lowi (1964) contended that the pluralist vision of democracy as a competition
among a large number of relatively equal groups has been replaced with ‘interest group
liberalism’ in which powerful groups capture the policy-making and implementation
process. Interest group liberalism cannot achieve rational policy results (because it is
unable to say ‘no’ to anyone) nor can it address issues of justice (because the state is
mainly the tool of powerful interests)” (Ibid., 22).
Garson, II.
'"' Brian Fay, Social Science and Political Practice (London: George Allan and
Unwin, Ltd., 1975). Used with permission of author.
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analysis. According to Fay, “the idea of a policy science arose, and has been embedded,
only in the context of industrial society.”'^ The advancement of science and technology
in modem industrial society led not only to a conceptual change of the stmcture of order
and authority from pre-industrial society of religion to the modem industrial society of
science and technology, but it also led to the advancement of a social science founded
upon a paradigm believed to be that of the natural sciences—the positivist paradigm.'^
Auguste Comte, the founder of positivism, had best articulated a second factor that
lead to the adoption of a positivist social science. Fay notes that Comte concluded that:
men’s attitudes themselves change as a result of the spread of the conceptual
assumptions inherent in natural science. For obvious reasons these changes make
obsolete or ineffective the religion or magic or traditional justifications from
authority which in pre-industrial societies had promoted order, established status,
set communal goals, and legitimated authority. Science deprives men of the old
faith by which they lived and thus helps to destroy their old social order; thus, it
can cause suffering and a sense of helplessness in the face of this suffering. It is
for this reason that a new faith, one compatible with and arising out of the
scientific spirit, must emerge from this chaos and lead men out of the void into
which they had been thrown."
In policy analysis, this new faith was provided by the positivist paradigm— a paradigm
that distinguishes between facts and values as knowable and not knowable, that believes
knowledge is based on observation and can be objective, and that utilizes scientific
methods for inquiry.

15

Ibid., 58.
Ibid., 18-20.

17

Ibid., 20.
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Thesis Questions
The positivist paradigm for policy analysis, what is still known today as the dominant
paradigm in policy analysis, has been under critical attack by theorists and practitioners
alike. Authors such has Brian Fay, Dvora Yanow, Deborah Stone, Frank Fischer, John
Forester, Martin Rein, M.E. Hawkesworth, Anne Larason Schneider, Helen Ingram, and
Rosemarie Tong have offered several criticisms regarding the positivist paradigm in
policy analysis. In response to these criticisms, theorists and practitioners of policy
analysis have offered or attempted to formulate various theories of policy analysis that
address the shortcomings of positivist theories. These alternative theories came to be
known as postpositivist theories or postempiricist theories. Although there are many
variations of postpositivist theories, they can be distinguished from positivist theories
based on their reliance on a similar paradigm—the general postpositivist paradigm. In
addition, some current offerings of postpositivist alternatives can be viewed as modem
versions of the anti-synoptie tradition, or neo-pluralist theories. In this, we can
understand some of the current offerings of postpositivist theories as a return to the anti
synoptic or pluralist traditions of the past.
The question that concerns this thesis is: are postpositivist theories viable alternatives
to positivist theories? Within the context of the scientific revolution that the science of
policy analysis is currently undergoing, this question is concerned with the question of
whether the success o f postpositivist theories, in overcoming the challenges presented by
the criticisms of positivist theories, warrants us to reject the positivist paradigm for the
general postpositivist paradigm? In other words, are there good reasons for accepting the
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general postpositivist paradigm as the new dominant paradigm, thereby calling for a
revolution in the science of policy analysis?
Due to practical constraints, the scope of this paper will be limited to only three
postpositivist theories; Dvora Yanow’s interpretive theory, Deborah Stone’s theory of
policy analysis as craft, and Frank Fischer’s discursive theory. Each of these theories
represents the three theoretical perspectives Goktug Morçôl identifies as perspectives of
the hermeneutic critique, which he claims to be arguably the most coherent theoretical
stream of postpositivist theories.*^ In evaluating these three theories, this thesis asks
whether: (1) these theories, each representing one of the three perspectives of the
hermeneutic critique, undertake to overcome the criticisms that positivist theories have
been charged? (2) If they do so adequately, then where is this success located? In other
words, is their success in overcoming the criticisms that positivist theories have been
charged due specifically to paradigm shifts? (3) If not, at what point do postpositivist
theories also succumb to the criticisms faced by positivist theories? And (4) are these
postpositivist theories subject to problems of their own, possibly arising from their
alternative paradigm?

Goktug Morçôl, A New Mind For Policy Analysis: Toward a Post-Newtonian and
Postpositivist Epistemology and Methodology (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002).
As Morçôl notes, “I group postpositivist theories in the policy analysis literature into five
theory streams: contextuality and presupposition theories, hermeneutic critique, problem
structuring and issue framing theories, methodological critique, and participatory policy
analysis. Arguably, among these theory streams, the hermeneutic critique presents the
most coherent perspective.. .There are three distinguishable, but overlapping, theoretical
perspectives within the hermeneutic critique: phenomenological/interpretive theories,
discourse theory, and critical theory” (Morçôl, 104-106).
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Outline of Chapters
In the beginning o f Chapter I, we were introduced to a brief history of how the
positivist paradigm became the dominant paradigm for policy analysis. This chapter was
an introduction to the conditions that led to the establishment of policy analysis in the
phase of normal science in the broader sense of a scientific revolution. As Thomas S.
Kuhn notes, before there is a revolution in a field of science, there is first a time of
‘normal science.’" After the establishment of the positivist paradigm as the dominant
paradigm in policy analysis, the field of policy analysis enjoyed a period of normal
science. The positivist paradigm served as the foundation for succeeding generations and
practitioners to carry out policy analysis.
Chapter II will provide a general outline of the positivist paradigm for policy analysis
along with some of the criticisms with which this paradigm, and its resulting theories
have been charged. In the broader sense of the revolution of the science of policy
analysis, this chapter introduces the kinds of criticisms that have slowly led many
theorists and practitioners to abandon the positivist paradigm for policy analysis. These
criticisms are founded upon the recognition that the objects of inquiry for policy analysis

" Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, 3d ed., (Chicago: The
University o f Chicago Press, 1996). ‘Normal science,’ as Kuhn continues, “means
research firmly based on one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that
some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the
foundation for its further practice” (Ibid., 10). These achievements “served for a time
implicitly to define the legitimate problems and methods of research for a field for
succeeding generations and practitioners,’ and they were able to do so because ‘the
achievement was sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents
away from competing modes of scientific activity’ and ‘it was sufficiently open ended to
leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve” (Ibid.).
Kuhn refers to the achievements that share these two characteristics as ‘paradigms’
(Ibid).
8
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are value-laden. This is similar to what Kuhn describes as the discovery of anomalies/*'
and led to a crisis in the field of policy analysis— a crisis in which theorists and
practitioners began to question the adequacy of the dominant positivist paradigm for
policy analysis. As Kuhn explains, these kinds of abandonment of a dominant paradigm
“are the pivots about which scientific revolutions tum.”^'
Chapter III introduces three theories that are to represent the three perspectives of the
hermeneutic critique. The theories are: Yanow’s interpretive theory as a representative of
the interpretive/phenomenological perspective, Stone’s craft theory as a representative of
the discourse perspective, and Fischer’s discursive theory as a representative of the
critical perspective. These theories are presented as three distinct postpositivist theories,
all sharing the same postpositivist paradigm.
In the broader sense, this chapter is an introduction to the end of crisis in the field of
policy analysis. As Kuhn notes, the end of crisis can occur in three ways, one of which is
“the emergence of a new candidate for paradigm and the ensuing battle over its
aceeptance.”^^ Thus, as this chapter introduces three theories, and their alternative
paradigm, that have been developed in response to the criticisms of positivist theories, it
at the same time introduces the new candidate paradigm for policy analysis, which marks
the end of crisis within the process of revolution for the science of policy analysis.
Chapter IV presents the evaluations of the three theories representing the three
theoretical perspectives of the hermeneutic critique. The evaluations are focused around

20

Ibid., 62.
Ibid., 34.
Ibid., 84.
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four specific challenges presented by the criticisms of positivist theories of policy
analysis. These challenges are: (1) the challenge of overcoming the ontological and
epistemological tenets of the faet-value dichotomy, (2) the challenge of providing a
democratic process o f decision-making within their method of policy analysis, (3) the
challenge of providing a coherent theory of policy analysis, and (4) the challenge of
resolving the problem of policy analysis as ideology.
In the broader sense, this chapter is a contribution to the revolutionary process of the
science of policy analysis by adding to the ensuing battle over the acceptance of the new
candidate paradigm—the general postpositivist paradigm. As stated by Kuhn, “The
resulting transition to a new paradigm is scientific revolution,”^^ but this transition cannot
occur until alternative paradigms have been evaluated as well; until it has been
established that these alternative paradigms are more worthy of aeeeptanee than the
dominant positivist paradigm for policy analysis. As Kuhn notes, “Paradigms gain their
status because they are more successful than their competitors in solving a few problems
that the group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute.”^"'
Finally, Chapter V is the concluding chapter to this thesis. This chapter begins with a
summary of the four previous chapters. Then it moves on to address the major questions
considered by this thesis. It answers the questions as to whether: (1) these theories, each
representing one of the three perspectives of the hermeneutic critique, undertake to
overcome the criticisms that positivist theories have been charged? (2) If they do so
adequately, then where is this success located? In other words, is their success in
23

Ibid., 90.
Ibid., 23.
10
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overcoming the criticisms that positivist theories have been charged due specifically to
paradigm shifts? (3) If not, at what point do postpositivist theories also succumb to the
criticisms faced by positivist theories? And (4) are these postpositivist theories subject to
problems of their own, possibly arising from their alternative paradigm? Finally, it
concludes with possible recommendations for the formulation of theories of policy
analysis.
In answering the major questions considered by this thesis, it is apparent that theories
of the hermeneutic critique, although agreeing on a similar general paradigm for policy
analysis, disagree in some respect as to the legitimate methods for policy analysis. Yet,
this discrepancy does not alter the possible acceptance of their general postpositivist
paradigm. As Kuhn notes, “[scientists] can, that is, agree in their identification of a
paradigm without agreeing on, or even attempting to produce, a full interpretation or
rationalization of it.”^^
In the broader sense of the scientific revolution of policy analysis, this chapter argues
for the aeeeptanee of the new candidate as the new paradigm for policy analysis. It
argues for the need to move beyond the positivist paradigm of policy analysis to the
general postpositivist paradigm. In essence, it calls for a revolution in the science of
policy analysis.

Ibid., 44.
11
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CHAPTER II

THE POSITIVIST PARADIGM
AND CRITICISMS
The Positivist Paradigm for Policy Analysis
As mentioned in Chapter I, the three factors Nagel identified as contributing to the
growth of policy analysis in general, and the factors noted by Garson and Fay regarding
the growth of positivist policy analysis,' established the positivist paradigm for policy
analysis as the dominant paradigm during the mid- to late-twentieth century/
In the following sections, I will first offer a summary of the major tenets that
constitute the general positivist paradigm. I will first explicate the major ontological
tenets of the positivist paradigm, then move on to the epistemological tenets, and finally
to the methodological tenets. By doing so, we will be able to see how the ontological
tenets lead to certain epistemological tenets, and how these epistemological tenets lead to

Nagel, 13; Garson, 10; Fay, 18-20.
^ According to a recent study by Morçôl, “policy professionals are not monolithieally
positivistic in their beliefs, but there is a considerable degree of support for positivistic
positions among them, especially among practitioners and those professionals whose
educational backgrounds are in economies, mathematics, and science” (Morçôl,
“Positivist Beliefs Among Policy Professionals; An Empirical Investigation”, Policy
Sciences, vol. 34, 2001: 395).
12
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methodological tenets. I will then offer some of the major arguments against the general
positivist paradigm.^
Later on, in Chapter III, the explication of the major tenets of the three theories
representing the three perspectives of the hermeneutic critique will be carried out in this
same manner. This allows us to locate the differences between the tenets of the positivist
paradigm and those of the three theories representing the three perspectives of the
hermeneutic critique.
In understanding the general tenets behind positivist theories of policy analysis, and
the criticisms of these tenets, we will come to understand how the theories, referred to by
Morçôl as theories of the hermeneutic critique, are among the theories formulated in
response to the positivist paradigm and their criticisms. Thus, we will come to
understand how these criticisms have led to the abandonment of the dominant positivist
paradigm for policy analysis—the pivots on which the revolution of the science of policy
analysis is turning.
1. Ontology
According to the Routledge Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, “The word ‘ontology’ is
used to refer to the philosophical investigation of existence, or being. Such investigation
may be directed towards the concept of being, asking what ‘being’ means, or what it is
for something to exist; it may also (or instead) be eoneemed with the question ‘what

^ It may be said that some of the criticisms of the general positivist paradigm offered
in this chapter may not be applicable to some positivist theories, yet it must be
understood that these criticisms are against the general understanding of positivist
theories, and the general paradigm that they may share. As mentioned, there are
numerous variations of positivist theories, and the paradigm presented in this chapter may
not necessarily be held by all positivist theories. Nor are criticisms presented necessarily
applicable to all positivist theories.
13
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exists?’ or ‘what general sorts of things there are?”’"* Also noted by the Routledge
Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, “It is eommon to speak of a philosopher’s ontology,
meaning the kinds of thing they take to exist, or ontology of a theory, meaning the things
that would have to exist for that theory to be true.”^
This second eommon usage of ontology, the ontology of a theory, is what is referred
to in this section regarding the ontology of positivist theories of policy analysis/ Thus,
the following presuppositions are the major tenets regarding the categories of things that
are assumed to exist, according to positivist theories of policy analysis, for the theories to
be able to bear out their implications. This usage of ontology is also what is referred to
later on in Chapter III regarding the ontology of the three theories representing the three
perspectives of the hermeneutic critique: Yanow’s interpretive theory. Stone’s analysis as
craft theory, and Fischer’s discursive theory.

"*Edward Craig, “Ontology”, in Routledge Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, para.l, 19982004, [encyclopedia on-line]; available from
http://www.rep.routledge.eom/articla/N039.html, Internet; accessed 4 May 2004.
^ Ibid.
^ Carl G. Hempel, a prominent figure in the philosophy of science and a former
member of the Vienna Cirele, refers to these ontologieal tenets as ‘internal prineiples.’
As he explains, internal principles “characterize the basic entities and processes invoked
by the theory and the laws to which they are assumed to conform” (Carl G. Hempel,
Philosophy o f Natural Science, Foundation of Philosophy Series, Engelwood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966, 72). HEMPEL, CARL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL
SCIENCE, 1st Edition, © 1966. Reprinted by permission o f Pearson Education, Inc.,
Upper Saddle River, NJ.
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a) Ontological Tenet of the
Fact-Value Dichotomy
One of the major ontological tenets held by positivist theories of policy analysis is the
faet-value dichotomy. According to the ontological tenet of the fact value-dichotomy,
there are two general categories of things that exist: physical objects and value claims.
Physical objects, simply put, are objects that have physical existence (location and
dimensions). These physical objects yield facts, which are prepositional statements of
knowledge that are supported by empirical evidence or data derived from observation of
physical objects. Value claims are those statements that cannot be support by physical
objects alone. In general, value claims are statements of belief that entail values or
normative criteria, interpretations, and meanings, such as ‘it is wrong to lie’ or ‘ice cream
is good.’
Yet, the ontological tenet of the faet-value dichotomy is not only the claim that fact
that there are two general categories of things, physical objects and value claims, but it is
also about how these categories of things are separated into categories of objects that can
yield knowledge or only nonsense. According to the ontological tenet of the faet-value
dichotomy, only physical objects are objects of knowledge, whereas value claims are not.
Thus, the ontologieal tenet of the faet-value dichotomy implies epistemological
assumptions that limit inquiry the kinds of objects for inquiry in positivist policy analysis
to physical objects by obviating inquiry into value-elaims.
b) The Tenet of Universal Laws
Another ontologieal tenet of positivist theories of policy analysis is that universal
laws exist. This second tenet is not only evident in their epistemological and
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methodological tenets, but it is also a tenet that reflects the hope of what can be
accomplished by positivist social science—the hope of social engineering. As Martin
Rein notes, according to the view of positivist social science:
The only effective way to manage the difficulties presented by man’s social
environment is through the systematic application of the ‘scientific method.’ We
know that this method has been used effectively in the natural sciences to win
control over the physical environment. If social science can apply these
techniques of analysis to social understanding, it may also acquire some of the
powerful predictive capabilities of the natural sciences. The influence of social
science, therefore, depends on its ability to discover general laws of social
processes which will eventually enable man to control his social environment.^
As we will see later on, universal laws of social phenomena are usually explicated in
the deductive-nomological form or the laws of probabilistic form. These universal laws,
explicated in deductive-nomological form or the laws of probabilistic form, deal
specifically with the correlation between or among physical objects or things that are
reducible to physical objects. Once tested and proven to an acceptable degree, they
become what are known to be scientific laws. In this sense, they become facts, or
propositional statements of knowledge about the correlation between physical objects that
are supported by empirical evidence.
2. Epistemology
According to the Cambridge Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, epistemology is “the study
of the nature o f knowledge and justification; specifically, the study of (a) the defining
features; (b) the substantive conditions, and (c) the limits of knowledge and

’ Martin Rein, Social Science and Public Policy (New York: Penguin Books Ltd.,
1976), 39.
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justification.”* Thus, this section asks, ‘given the ontology of positivist paradigms, the
category of things that are assumed to exist, what are the criteria for knowledge for the
category of things that are assumed to exist?’ This is the meaning of epistemology also
referred to in the following chapter regarding the epistemology of the three theories
representing the three perspectives of the hermeneutic critique.
a)

Epistemological Tenet of the
Fact-Value Dichotomy

One of the major epistemological tenets of the positivist paradigm is the assumption
of the fact-value dichotomy. This is the assumption that, “All knowledge was believed to
depend on observation, thus any claims, whether theological, metaphysical,
philosophical, ethical, normative, or aesthetic, which were not rooted in empirical
observation, were rejected as meaningless.”^ This tenet is founded upon the verification
criterion of meaning, which “stipulated that a contingent criterion of meaning is
meaningful if, and only if, it could be empirically verified.”'*’ Therefore, according to the
epistemological tenet of the fact-value dichotomy only facts, which are supported by
empirical evidence, can be meaningful and so be knowledge. Those propositional
statements that are supported by value claims are regarded as meaningless, and so cannot
be items of knowledge. Thus, according to the epistemological tenet of the fact-value

* Paul K. Moser, “Epistemology”, ed. R. Audi, in The Cambridge Dictionary o f
Philosophy, 2d ed. (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1999), 273.
^ M.E. Hawkesworth, Theoretical Issues in Policy Analysis (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 1988), 38.
Ibid.
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dichotomy, the appropriate objects of inquiry are physical objects, and only facts can be
knowledge.
b)

Characteristics of Knowledge

Derived from their ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value
dichotomy, positivist theories of policy analysis conclude that one can obtain knowledge
that is free of politics and individual biases. According to Hawkesworth, “Mutually
reinforcing empiricist [or positivist] assumptions dispel questions concerning the political
cast of empiricist commitments by providing a formula for preserving the objectivity of
scientific investigations and for insulating scientific research from the taint of politics.”"
As noted by Richard S. Rudner, the word ‘objective’ “has been used, in fact, to apply to
at least four different things: (1) the verisimilitude of ideas, i.e., the replicalike character
of mental imagery, (2) the truth of statements, (3) the reliability of methodologies, and
(4) the psychological disposition of an investigator to have or believe, or employ the
kinds of ideas, statements, or methodologies mentioned under 1,2, or 3.”'^ Here,
Hawkesworth is referring to the third use of ‘objectivity’ defined by Rudner. Thus, it is
concluded that because the reliability of scientific investigation is preserved and scientific
research is insulated from political taint, that the results of such research—the knowledge
gained ifom such research—would be ‘objective’ in regard to the truth of the statements.
Any other claims are ‘subjective.’

"ib id ., 3.
Richard S. Rudner, “On the Objectivity of Social Science,” ed. G. Riley, in Values,
Objectivity, and the Social Sciences (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.,
1974), 40-41.
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c) Purpose of Inquiry
Another major epistemological tenet held by positivist theories of policy analysis in
general is the belief that “the task of science [is] understood to consist in the inductive
discovery of regularities which [exist] in the external world.”

These regularities,

understood as scientific laws provide:
The foundation for scientific explanation, which according to the precepts of the
Covering Law model [the causal model of explanation], consisted in
demonstrating that the events to be explained could have been expected, given
certain initial conditions.. .and the general laws of the field.... Within the
framework of the positivist conception of science, the discovery of scientific laws
also provided the foundation for prediction which consisted in demonstrating that
an event would occur given the future occurrence of certain initial conditions and
the operations of the general laws of the field."
Thus, according to this tenet, scientific explanation is to be in the form of a deductivenomological explanation, also referred to as the Covering Law model of explanation.
Yet, according to Hempel, this is not the only form that scientific explanations can
take. The deductive-nomological form of scientific explanation provides the strongest
sense of an explanation, for “in deductive inferences from tme premises [as in deductivenomological explanations], the conclusion is invariably true.”'^ Another form of
explanation that a scientific explanation can take is, as Hempel states,
probabilistic form or probabilistic laws, for short.”

of

According to Hempel,

A probabilistic explanation of a particular event shares certain basic
characteristics with the corresponding deductive-nomological type of explanation.
13

Hawkesworth, 38.
Ibid., 39
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In both cases, the event is explained in reference to others, with which the
explanandum event is connected by laws. But in one case, the laws are of
universal form; in the other, of probabilistic form. And while the deductive
explanation shows that, on the information contained in the explanans, the
explanandum was to be expected with ‘deductive certainty’, an inductive
explanation shows only that, on the information contained in the explanans, the
explanandum was to be expected with high probability, and perhaps with
“practical certainty.”"
Thus, according to positivist theories of policy analysis, knowledge of social phenomena
is to be explicated in the deductive-nomological form or the form of probabilistic laws.
The basis of both of these forms of knowledge is that they denote patterns or regularities
of physical objects, and can be verified at least in principle by empirical evidence.
In order to explicate a social phenomenon in terms of deductive-nomological form or
the form of probabilistic laws, positivist theories of policy analysis in general require that
the explanation of the social phenomenon must meet the verification criterion of
meaning. Again, this is the criterion that, “A contingent proposition is meaningful if, and
only if, it could be empirically verified.”'* In order for a proposition to be empirically
verifiable, the proposition must meet the two criteria of scientific explanation: the
criterion of explanatory relevance and the criterion of testability.
According to Hempel, the criterion of explanatory relevance requires that “the
explanatory information adduced affords good grounds for believing that the
phenomenon to be explained did, or does, indeed occur.”"’ ‘Good grounds’, according to
Hempel requires a physical account of the phenomenon. As Hempel explains with his

" Ibid., 59
'* Hawkesworth, 38.
Hempel, 48.
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example of the scientific explanation of a rainbow, “The explanatory information
provided by the physical account would constitute good grounds for expecting or
believing that a rainbow will appear under the specific circumstances.”^*’ This is a
tautological explanation of ‘good grounds.’ ‘Good grounds’ is the physical account of a
phenomenon. Thus, only those objects that can be given physical accounts or reducible
to physical accounts can produce knowledge that meet the criterion of explanatory
relevance. This then makes value claims ontologically dependent. In essence, the
criterion of explanatory relevance limits the scope of inquiry to physical objects or those
things reducible to physical objects.
The criterion of testability claims that, “The statements constituting a scientific
explanation must be capable of empirical test.”^' This criterion assumes that an
explanation in which “no empirical findings could possibly bear it out or disconfirm it’ is
‘devoid of empirical content’ and therefore ‘affords no grounds for expecting the
characteristic p h e n o m e n o n . T h u s , any finding that fails to meet the criterion of
testability is considered to lack “objective explanatory power”;^^ it is unable to yield any
causal explanation in the form of a deductive-nomological explanation, or probabilistic
law, and is therefore useless to scientific inquiry. As Hempel explains:
If a statement or set of statements is not testable at least in principle, in other
words, if it has no test implications at all [in that there are no empirical data to
refer to], then it cannot be significantly proposed or entertained as a scientific

^*’ Ibid.
" Ibid., 49.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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hypothesis or theory, for no conceivable empirical finding can then accord or
conflict with it. In this case, it has no bearing whatever on empirical
phenomenon, or as we will say, it lacks empirical import?'^
In other words, any causal explanation that lacks empirical import, is not empirically
testable, and cannot be maintained as a significant scientific explanation since the
explanation cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed through scientific testing—it cannot be
shown to be true or false. And, as Hempel notes, “deductive-nomological explanations
satisfy the requirements of explanatory relevance in the strongest sense: the explanatory
information they provide implies the explanandum sentence deductively offers logically
conclusive grounds why the explanandum phenomenon is to be expected.”^^
Probabilistic laws are also thought to meet the two requirements of relevancy and
testability for a scientific explanation, though they are believed to do so to a lesser
degree, for they employ the logic of inductive reasoning rather than deductive reasoning.
Thus, also according to the criterion of testability, only physical objects, or those
objects that can be reduced to physical objects, can yield knowledge, since only physical
objects have empirical import and so, are testable.
3. Methodology
Also according to the Cambridge Dictionary o f Philosophy, methodology is a branch
of the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of science is “the branch of philosophy
that is centered on a critical examination of the sciences: their methods and their results.
[The branch of methodology] explores the methods by which science arrives at its posited
24

Ibid., 30.

Ibid., 52. By ‘explanandum sentence’, Hempel means “the sentence describing [the
phenomenon]...’ and by explanandum phenomenon, Hempel means ‘the phenomenon to
be accounted for by an explanation” (Ibid., 50).
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truths concerning the world and critically explores alleged rationales for these
methods.”^^ Thus, the question regarding methodology addressed in the following
section is, ‘what are the major tenets of the positivist paradigm in regard to the methods
of inquiry for obtaining knowledge of those category of things that are assumed to exist?’
A similar question is addressed in Chapter III regarding the methods of the three theories
representing the three perspective of the hermeneutic critique.
a)

The Positivist Tenet of the Unity of Science

Methodologically, positivist theories of policy analysis uphold the unity of science.
This is the tenet that “the logic of scientific inquiry was the same for all fields. Whether
natural phenomena or social phenomena were the objects of study, the method for
acquiring valid knowledge and the requirements for explanation and prediction remained
the same.”^’ It is important to note here, that the positivist’s tenet of the unity of science
specifically entails that the appropriate paradigm for natural and social science is the
paradigm used for natural science. This tenet leads to the subsumption of methods
analogous to the scientific method of inquiry within the positivist paradigm for policy
analysis.

Lawrence Sklar, “Philosophy of Science”, ed. R. Audi, in The Cambridge
Dictionary o f Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 700.
Hawkesworth, 39.
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b) The Tenet of the Rational Model
of Decision-Making
The subsumption of a method of inquiry analogous to what Hempel refers to as the
method o f hypothesis leads theories of positivist policy analysis to use models of rational
decision-making as methods for policy analysis/*
As Hempel explains:
Scientific Knowledge, as we have seen, is not arrived at by applying some
inductive inference procedure to antecedently collected data, but rather by what is
often called “the method of hypothesis”, i.e. by inventing hypotheses as tentative
answers to a problem under study, and then subjecting these to empirical test. It
will be part of such test to see whether the hypothesis is borne out by whatever
relevant findings may have been gathered before its formulation; an acceptable
hypothesis will have to fit the available relevant data. Another part of the test will
consist in deriving new test implications from the hypothesis and checking these
by suitable observations or experiments. As we noted earlier, even extensive
testing with entirely favorable results does not establish a hypothesis
conclusively, but provides only more or less strong support for it.^^
Modeled after the method of hypothesis, positivist theories of policy analysis use a
rational decision-making model of inquiry. As Jenkins-Smith explains:
In the style of the rational decision maker, the policy analyst is to use a range of
analytical techniques and multiple fields of knowledge to engage in a number of
distinct procedures or steps, including: (1) identifying the ‘problem’ to be
resolved, (2) specifying the goal(s) to be sought through the public policy, (3)
identifying or inventing the available policy alternatives, (4) estimating the effects
of each o f the alternatives, both favorable and unfavorable, (5) imputing values in
a single, commensurable metric to those effects, and (6) choosing the ‘best’ policy
alternative according to an explicit decision rule.^*’

^* Hempel, 17.
Ibid., 17-18.
Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Democratic Politics and Policy Analysis (Belmont, CA:
Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1990), II. Jenkins-Smith notes that “Many such lists
of steps are enumerated in the policy analysis literature, each quite similar to the list
presented here. See, for example, Stoky and Zeckhauser, A Primer o f Policy Analysis, pp.
5-6; David Nachmias, Public Policy Evaluation: Approaches and Methods (New York:
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Here we see that the first three steps of the rational model of decision-making are
similar to the first step of the method of hypothesis, that of formulating a hypothesis. The
following two steps, steps four and five, correlate with the next step in the method of
hypothesis, that o f testing the hypothesis. The final step, step six, of choosing the ‘best’
policy alternative correlates with the final step within the method of hypothesis, that of
determining whether the test implications warrant support of the hypothesis. In the case
of the rational model of decision-making for policy analysis, to conclude that the
empirical data or facts supports a specific policy alternative to a greater degree is to say
that that specific policy alternative is the best in comparison to rival alternatives, just as
in the method of hypothesis wherein experimental results are used to validate a specific
theory that is in contest with other theories.
To further explicate the rational model of decision-making in policy analysis, it is
important to understand that in many positivist theories of policy analysis the goals or
objectives, and the problems, are understood to be given by the decision-maker or makers
and are reducible to physical objects that can be quantifiably measured. As Quade notes,
the objectives are “often stated or implied by the decision-maker.”^' This is because
according to the ontological and epistemological tenets of the positivist paradigm for
policy analysis, value claims are outside the limits of their field of inquiry, yet policy

St. Martins Press, 1979) pp. 12-18; Alice Rivlin, Systematic Thinking fo r Social Action
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1971), pp. 3-5. The Graduate School of Public
Policy at the University of California at Berkeley propounds a version of the above list
called the ‘eightfold path,’ which seeks to give somewhat greater emphasis to the role of
analysis in creating policy alternatives. For a critique of this restrictive ‘problem solving’
approach, see Martin Rein and Sheldon White, ‘Policy Research Belief and Doubt,’ in
Policy Analysis, 3(2) (Spring 1977), pp. 239-271” (Ibid).
Quade, 45.
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necessarily deals with values in terms of goals or objectives. Thus, positivist theories of
policy analysis attempt to stay within the boundaries of inquiry set by their ontological
and epistemological tenets by leaving the determination of goals or objectives to the
decision-maker(s), or taking them as ‘given’ by the framing of the problem.
In addition. Stone notes that there are in general five concepts that dominate the
language of policy discourse in regards to goals: equity, efficiency, security, liberty, and
community ‘goals.’ These vague and ambiguous concepts, as Stone continues, are often
treated as having a single definition or criterion,^^ and this single definition or criterion is
established by the decision-maker(s). By treating them as having a single definition or
criterion, it is assumed that they are amenable to quantitative measurements of variables
that are characterized by physical objects. Thus, positivist policy analysts not only
understand goals as given by the decision-maker(s), but they are given in terms that are,
or can be reducible to physical objects. The basis of this treatment of goals can be
located in their ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value dichotomy. The
ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value dichotomy, as stated earlier, limit
the scope of valid inquiry to physical objects, or those things that are reducible to
physical objects, in order to arrive at valid knowledge.
In regard to problems, problem definition is generally understood as “a statement of a
goal and the discrepancy between it and the status quo.”^^ In this sense, the problem is

Deborah Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art o f Political Decision Making, rev. ed.
(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 2002), 37. FROM POLICY PARADOX:
The Art of Political Decision Making by Deborah Stone. Copyright © 1997,1988 by
Deborah Stone. Used by permission of W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. Also, Used by
permission of author.
Ibid., 133.
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also given by the decision-maker(s) and reducible to the analysis of physical objects. As
Stone notes, defining the problem becomes “a matter of observation and arithmetic—
measuring the difference between two states of affairs.”^'' This assumption is also
informed by the ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value dichotomy.
Thus, it is believed that the discrepancy between the stated goals and the status quo can
also be determined by quantifiable measurements of physical objects.
The steps four, five, and six within the method of rational decision-making are also
entailed by the ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value dichotomy.
Although the third step of creating alternatives relies on the imagination of the analyst,
the steps of estimating the effects of each of the alternatives, both favorable and
unfavorable; imputing values in a single, commensurable metric to those effects; and
choosing the ‘best’ policy alternative, or providing a hierarchy of alternatives, according
to an explicit decision rule are highly dependent upon empirical evidence. In regard to
estimating the effects o f each alternative of the alternatives (both favorable and
unfavorable), and imputing values in a single, commensurable metric to those effects,
requires the analyst to “define the variables [of the social problem] in terms of specific
indicators.”^^ In regard to choosing the ‘best’ policy alternative, or providing a hierarchy
of alternatives, according to an explicit decision rule, most often, empirical evidence is
sought through the quantitative analysis of the defined variables, and the criterion of

34

Ibid.

Ann Majchrzack, Methods fo r Policy Research, vol. 3, Applied social Research
Methods Series (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1984). For a more detailed
explanation o f this, please see Majchrzak, Methods fo r Policy Research,
“Operationalization of Variable”, 55-58.
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efficiency is used to determine which alternative is the ‘best’ alternative/^ As Fay
explains, this is the primary concern of the positivist policy analyst, in that they are
concerned only with determining the ‘best’ means to a given end in light of other
alternatives.
c) Defining the Purpose of Policy Analysis
Finally, positivist theories of policy analysis, informed by their tenet of the unity of
science and the rational model of decision-making, uphold a specific definition of policy
analysis. As mentioned, the ultimate objective of positive policy analysis is “choosing
the ‘best’ policy alternative according to an explicit decision rule.”^'' This leads to the
conclusion that the main goal of policy analysis is to arrive at a specific solution, the
‘best’ policy alternative. This conception of policy analysis necessarily entails a specific
choice for the policy maker, that choice being the one that has been determined as the
‘best’ in light of other alternatives.
In this sense, the positivist paradigm for policy analysis portrays policy analysis as a
puzzle to be solved. One of the main characteristics of a puzzle is the assured existence
of a solution.^* Thus, according to positivist conceptions of policy analysis, there is
always a solution to any policy problem; all that is needed is the proper application of the
accepted paradigm for the analysis of policy. In this sense, the positivist paradigm for
policy analysis can be seen as insulating the analyst from the kinds of problems that do
not fit the puzzle form, such as problems of conflicting values, interpretations, and

^^Fay, 50-51.
^Jenkins-Smith, 11.
Kuhn, 37.
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meanings. As Kuhn notes, “A paradigm can, for that matter, even insulate the
community [of scientists] from those socially important problems that are not reducible to
the puzzle form, because they cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and
instrumental tools the paradigm supplies.
Criticisms of the Positivist Paradigm
in Policy Analysis
Recently, there is resurgence and a growing acknowledgement of the criticisms
against the general positivist paradigm in policy analysis. Much of this is due to the still
pervasive use of positivist theories in policy analysis. Criticisms of the positivist
paradigm of policy analysis speak not only of the flaws within the foundations of
positivist theories of policy analysis, but also to the shortcomings of the practice of
positivist policy analysis. One of these shortcomings has been discussed by Beryl A.
Radin regarding the difficulties presented by the use of cost-benefit analysis, a prevalent
method of rational decision-making used by positivist theories of policy analysis. As
Radin notes:
There is a wide range of technical problems involved in the application of the
cost-benefit approach. Identifying and monetizing relevant impacts and
discounting for time and risk are much easier to accomplish when one is faced
with a decision about building or not building a specific dam than when the
decision involves a program administered by fifty different states. Even then, as
Daniel Mazmanian and Jeanne Nienaber point out, the technique is often less
clear-cut than it appears at first blush. The entrance of the environmental
movement into the decision environment of the Army Corps of Engineers forced
that agency to think about decisions that have value conflicts surrounding them.
When environmental advocates began to do their adversarial eost-benefit analysis.

Ibid.
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it became very clear that the federal government was facing policy choices
involving value disputes, not simply technical determinations
These kinds o f value disputes, which illustrate how positivist methods of policy
analysis are ill equipped at handling certain policy issues, are likened to the anomalies of
scientific discoveries discussed by Kuhn. As Kuhn notes, “Discovery commences with
the awareness of anomaly, i.e. with the recognition that nature has somehow violated the
paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal science. It then continues with a
more or less exploration of the area of anomaly. And it closes only when the paradigm
theory has been adjusted so that the anomalous has become expected.’" ' Here then we
see that value disputes— a characteristic of the nature of many social phenomena—
violated the positivist paradigm induced expectations of the ability of such methods as
cost-benefit analysis to solve certain policy problems.
The importance o f this, in the broader sense of the revolution of the science of policy
analysis, is that at times the anomalous necessitates a paradigm shift—in that the
dominant paradigm is unable, without its own destruction, to adjust itself in order to
make the anomalous expected. In policy analysis, due to the positivist paradigm’s
ontological and epistemological tenets, the positivist paradigm for policy analysis is
inherently unable to adjust itself to make issues regarding values expected. What is
important to note here is that anomalies such as value disputes that the positivist
paradigm is unable to make expected point to an inconsistency between the positivist
paradigm, and their theories, and the nature of the subject of policy analysis. This

Beryl A. Radin, Beyond Machiavelli: Policy Analysis Comes o f Age (Washington,
DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000), 114.
Kuhn, 52-53.
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inconsistency between the dominant paradigm in policy analysis and the nature of social
phenomenon sparked the kinds of criticisms of the positivist paradigm that led to its
abandonment—the pivots on which scientific revolution turns.
Fay, in Social Theory and Political Practice, has also offered some of the criticisms
that are rooted in the discovery of anomalies, such as value disputes, under the positivist
paradigm for policy analysis.

He criticizes positivist paradigms of policy analysis,

arguing that: (1) the limitations placed on policy analysis by the general positivist
paradigm reduces the task of policy analysts to simply providing means to a given end;
(2) that the idea of positivist policy analysis is incoherent; (3) that the positivist paradigm
not only denies a democratic process of decision-making, but in that it does so, (4) it
constitutes an ideology rooted in the values of modem industrial society and the
dominating powers, which undermines the positivist’s claim that their analysis is nonideological. Although Fay offers four arguments, he notes that the first argument is more
a qualification upon the positivist conception of policy analysis, and not necessarily an
argument against its coherence."*^
1. Values are within Limits of Positivist
Policy Analysis
Fay’s first argument is that the intent of positivist policy analysts to limit their field of
inquiry to physical objects, first results in limiting their task to simply providing means to
a given end. He argues that policy scientists, also referred to as positivist policy analysts.

Such authors as Dvora Yanow, Deborah Stone, Frank Fischer, John Forester,
Martin Rein, M.E. Hawkesworth, Anne Larason Schneider, Rosemarie Tong, and Helen
Ingram have also discussed criticisms similar to Fay’s.
Fay, 51.
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seek to maintain the fact-value dichotomy by only concerning themselves with the task of
determining the ‘best’ means to a given end. As he explains:
The policy scientist carmot make all of the necessary decisions, for.. .any
conception of the scientisation of politics must take account of the distinction
between fact and value. This has been done by drawing another distinction
between means and ends, the idea being the simple one that the choice of the ends
to be pursued is thought to be a choice requiring a value judgment, but that the
question as to the best means to a prescribed end is thought to be a factual
question and therefore decidable scientifically. Thus, it is that the policy scientist
is thought to be competent only in deciding the ‘best means’, which is to say that
the social policies he recommends are those which are instrumental to achieving
certain posited ends."
Thus, by only being concerned with the issue of determining the ‘best means’ to a given
end, it is concluded that policy scientists effectively steer clear of issues concerning
values when they are not reducible to physical objects.
Yet, as Fay argues, this task of determining the ‘best’ means to a given end requires a
standard to which one can measure various means. In the policy sciences, this standard is
often the criterion of efficiency. And, as Fay continues, “The concept of efficiency alone
cannot provide an adequate standard in terms of which objective decisions can be made,
for the concept of efficiency is a purely formal term signifying the ratio of amount of
work performed to the total energy expended, and as such it can only have content, and
therefore practical meaning, when one provides another standard in terms of which work
and energy can be identified and measured.”"*^ This implies that in deciding the ‘best
means’, the policy analyst must still address value claims, for determining the ‘best
means’ to a given end entails one to ask and the analyst to answer “efficient in terms of
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what?’"^ Thus, Fay concludes that limiting the task of policy analysis to determining the
‘best’ means does not sufficiently insulate the task of the policy analyst from issues of
values, for even when they concern themselves only with determining the ‘best’ or most
efficient means to a given end, this task presupposes a value judgment that the analyst
must make.
It is important to keep in mind that this argument, according to Fay, does not
necessarily show the incoherence of positivist policy analysis, it instead argues that the
framework of positivist policy analysis presupposes notions of values even when set at
the sole task of considering the ‘best’ means to a given end. As Fay admits, “All my
argument demonstrates is that the value-framework within which the policy scientist
operates is more extensive than at first supposed - for it now includes standards of
judgment as well as goals.”"" And, as he continues, “within the admittedly more
constricted region defined by this framework, however, the policy scientist can practice
his trade.”"** One may claim that the task of the policy scientist, within its limited
framework, now becomes the task of simply providing means to a given end."*^ The
matter of determining which means is ‘best’ can be left to the decision-maker(s). Thus,
by only providing means, it is assumed that the policy scientist can still maintain a factvalue dichotomy, but as Fay continues to argue, the positivist analyst must still obtain

" Ibid.
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some standard of judgment even when confining policy analysis to questions about
means.
2. Incoherence of Positivist Paradigm
for Policy Analysis
Yet, as Fay continues to argue, “the argument against the idea of scientifically
selecting the best means is related to the relativity of ends and means, and so in this way:
all policy scientists are willing to admit that the ends of action reflect the values of the
person who chooses this end, but they maintain that the means to this end are all valueneutral, and that their worth is to be decided solely in terms of their instrumental value of
their contribution to the achievement to the given end.’"** And, since there is no clear
distinction between means and ends, for depending on the point of view, any means can
be understood as an end, “If any particular course of action can be either a ‘means’ or an
end, then it must be the case that even so-called ‘means’ reflect the values and life
commitments of the person who supports it, since this means is itself an end from another
perspective.”^'
As Fay continues to explain, means are political proposals, and "'All political
proposals, no matter how instrumental, will alter and shape the personal relations of at
least some of the members of a society, and will reflect the relative welfare of various
classes of people; as such they embody moral notions as to what is permissible, just, or
right in human affairs. They are a species of moral statements.”^^ Thus, the
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determination of means entail values, and this then makes the idea of a value-neutral
analysis incoherent, for “attempts at bracketing values away from social policies by
making them a part of the framework within which the policy scientist must operate
would result, in the last analysis, in making it impossible for the policy scientist to
propose anything.’"^
Authors such as Yanow, Stone, and Fischer, have all argued similarly that inquiry
into determining means requires the analyst to address value claims that entail various
values, interpretations, and meanings. These kinds of criticisms are rooted in the
understanding that the objects of inquiry in policy analysis are necessarily value-laden,
thus attempting to make the task of policy analysis value-neutral by attempting to simply
provide means, results in an inconsistence between the theoiy of policy analysis and the
nature of object of policy analysis. In this sense, it can be concluded that positivist
theories of policy analysis are externally incoherent. The three theories representing the
three perspectives of the hermeneutic critique—those of Yanow, Stone, and Fischer—and
of postpositivist theories in general, specifically attempt to address this failing in
positivist theories of policy analysis when formulating their own theories.
3. Denial of Democratic Process
of Decision-Making
Third, Fay argues that even if it was given “that a policy scientist could impartially
determine the most efficient means to a given end’, his argument regarding the
incoherence of a value-neutral policy science is still applicable, for engaging ‘in this type
of political decision-making itself betrays a certain conception of the purposes and needs

" Ibid., 53.
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of men which the political sphere is supposed to satisfy, and it therefore incorporates
certain values.”" This argument speaks specifically of the positivist paradigm’s failure
in recognizing the importance of a democratic process within the process of political
decision-making, and can be understood as a consequence of positivist theories’ attempts
to remain value-neutral. As Fay continues to explain, the positivist conception of
political decision-making, also referred to as technocratic decision-making, speaks
against the notion of political decision-making derived from the Aristotelian conception
of politics in which members of the society come together in order to “participate in the
process of determining the conditions of their lives.
This Aristotelian conception of politics, unlike what has been referred to as the
positivist’s technocratic notion of politics, “emphasises [^/c] the social character of men’s
self consciousness, claiming that the idea men have of themselves, of what is appropriate,
right, and fitting, of what their abilities and capacities are, of what they are worth and
what they ought to value and aspire towards - all of these ideas which comprise men’s
images of themselves are a function of the social world in which they live.”^^ In that
positivist theories of policy analysis deny this Aristotelian conception of politics, they
deny alternative sets of interpretations or values access to the decision-making process.
They assume that all men hold or ought to hold the same values and the same conceptions
of themselves. Thus, the criticism that positivist theories of policy analysis deny
democratic processes of decision-making points to the failure of positivist theories to

" Ibid.
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recognize that people do not share the same values and conceptions of themselves. By
assuming that people do, the analysis not only reflects a certain set of values and
conceptions that people have of themselves, which goes against their value-neutral notion
of policy analysis, but the resulting analysis is also ill informed.
4.

Positivist’s Paradigm for Policy Analysis
Presupposes Ideology

Fourth, Fay argues that “the positivist paradigm is one that claims that it is nonideological, i.e. it claims to be different from all other approaches to understanding
human behavior, social institutions and history in that it is value-neutral, that its truth
neither presupposes nor entails certain judgments on the part of the social scientist in
order for his statements to be true.”^’ This claim is rooted in their epistemological tenet
that the knowledge derived from positivist inquiry is 'objective' in regard to the truth of
the statement. Yet, as Fay continues, the positivist paradigm, by being products of
modem industrial society, by the values that they implicitly instill, and by the reification
of the status quo social institutions and customs of society, reflects an ideology when
their conclusions enter the political or social realm.^*
As Fay explains there are four features of positivist policy science that contribute to
its ideological character. The first feature is that the “idea of policy science arose, and
has been embedded, only in the context of industrial society.”^^ Thus, positivist
paradigms are rooted in a conception of social organization that “reinforces the policy
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scientific ideal by its viewing people and their social relations in terms of their
instrumental value, and its requiring control over social processes.’"**
The second feature that contributes to the ideological character of positivist theories
of policy analysis is that in seeking general laws of society in order to explain and control
events, the positivist social scientist “views social relations as if they were processes
which have a life of their own and which function in the way they do regardless of the
wishes of the actors who engage in them.”^' This feature stems from the positivist’s
assumption of the existence of general laws of social processes, an assumption in which
the possibility of a value-neutral policy analysis is founded. “From this perspective,’ as
Fay continues, ‘it ought to be clear that the policy scientific approach gives to the social
order - which is nothing more than the conventional activities of its members, together
with their beliefs, expectations and desires - the qualities of an object which exists
irrespective o f the ideas of men.”^^ Thus, the policy scientist by accepting these social
arrangements as necessary, reify “either the basic structures of the society being studied,
those fundamental institutions, customs, habits, and ideas which give to this society its
distinctive identity (in the case of laws which are applicable to a given society), or certain
recurring structural relationships (in the case of laws which purportedly apply to all forms
of social organization, and which are instantiated in the society under question in some

way).”^^
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The third feature that contributes to the ideological character of positivist theories of
policy analysis is in their assumption of “the twin assumptions that a scientific approach
in political life can ensure a rational solution to political problems, and that only
questions of means, or instrumental questions, are amenable to a scientific solution.”"
Thus, criticism of the societal means, ends, and values, would be severely limited,
thereby reinforcing the continued existence of such a society.
This feature stems from the assumption of the unity of science, and the ontological
and epistemological assumptions of the fact-value dichotomy. The unity of science
assumes that “the logic of scientific inquiry was the same for all fields. Whether natural
phenomena or social phenomena were the objects of study, the method for acquiring
valid knowledge and the requirements for explanation and prediction remained the
same.”" Thus, it is assumed that the methods of science can be used to study and solve
the problems of society; problems that are put in terms of quantifiable variables in
accordance with the ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value dichotomy.
The fourth feature that contributes to the ideological character of positivist theories of
policy analysis is that in relegating issues of values to decision-maker(s), those who are
understood as dominant members of the society within a society characterized by
dominant-submissive social relations, the positivist paradigm “would almost inevitably
be supportive of those who are dominant.’" ’ These four features, as Fay argues, “Interact

64

Ibid., 61.

" Ibid.
" Hawkesworth, 39.
Fay, 61-62.
39

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

with one another to support the status quo of an industrial society,’"* and thereby
represent the ideology of the dominant members of a modem industrial society.

Summary
In presenting a summary of the major tenets of the positivist paradigm, we saw how
the ontological and epistemological tenets are employed to attempt to limit not only the
problems that are to be considered by the policy analyst, but also the character of the
solution and the methods of inquiry, to physical objects or those things reducible to
physical objects. In essence, as noted by Kuhn, these are the effects of a paradigm.
According to Kuhn, the scientific community acquires from paradigms not only “a
criterion for choosing problems’, but also rules ‘that limit both the nature of acceptable
solutions and the steps by which they are to be obtained.”^^

" Ibid., 62.
Kuhn, 38.
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CHAPTER III

THEORIES OF THE HERMENEUTIC
CRITIQUE
In response to the criticisms of positivist theories of policy analysis, theorists and
practitioners formulated theories that are thought to address the shortcomings of positivist
theories of policy analysis. These theories have been identified by most theorists and
practitioners as postpositivist theories of policy analysis. According to Morçôl, “There
are several theoretieal streams [within postpositivism], some of which do not even use the
title postpositivism.'"^ He has identified these theoretical streams according to the
following categories: “contextuality and presupposition theories, hermeneutic critique,
problem structuring and issue framing theories, methodological critique, and
participatory policy analysis.”^ He goes on to note that, “Arguably, among these theory
streams, the hermeneutic critique presents the most coherent perspective.”^ For this
reason, this chapter and this thesis as a whole, will focus on theories of the hermeneutic
critique.

Specifically, this chapter will focus on summarizing three specific theories

' Morçôl, 104.
^Ibid.
^ Ibid. These theories have been named for their use of hermeneutic methods.
As Morçôl notes, the “There is a series of commonly held postpositivist
epistemological assumptions that are espoused in the policy analysis literature, but there
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representing the three perspectives within the hermeneutic critique. As Morçôl explains
regarding his eategory of the hermeneutic critique, “There are three distinguishable, but
overlapping, theoretical perspectives within the hermeneutic critique:
phenomenological/interpretive theory, discourse theory, and critical theory.”^ As a
representative of the phenomenological/interpretive perspective, this chapter will present
a summary of Dvora Yanow’s interpretive theory. As a representative of the discourse
perspective, this chapter will present a summary of Deborah Stone’s theory of poliey
analysis as craft, and as a representative of the critical perspective, this chapter will
present a summary of Frank Fischer’s discursive theory.^ It is important to note here that
although all three theories are distinct in several ways, they can be understood as sharing
a similar paradigm—the general postpositivist paradigm.
The method of presenting a summary of each of these theories is to explicate each
theory in terms of ontological, epistemological, and methodological tenets. In doing so,
this chapter is meant not only to provide a starting point for the discussion in Chapter IV,

is also considerable theoretical variation among post positivist theories” (Ibid., 104).
This indeed makes mapping the geography of postpositivist theories very difficult. Yet,
Morçôl provides a taxonomy of these theories, and this is the taxonomy that is used by
this thesis.
^ Ibid., 106.
^ Fischer describes his framework as postempirieist. As Fischer notes in Reframing
Policy Analysis, ‘postempiricism’ and ‘postpositivism’ are terms defined differently by
various scholars, “[But] in [his] introductory chapter they should be read to refer
generally to the search for an epistemology (or theory of knowledge) and a methodology
that transcends the narrow focus on ‘objective’ empirical research that has been the goal
of a ‘value-free’ positivist social science” (Fischer, 12, footnote # 10). According to this
definition of postempiricism, Yanow’s theory and Stone’s theory can also be
characterized as postempirieist, thus this paper will refer speeifically to Fischer’s theory
as a discursive theory in order to maintain the conceptual distinction between the three
theories.
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wherein strengths and weaknesses of how these theories address the shortcomings of
positivist theories o f policy analysis will be discussed, but also to introduce the reader to
the foundational pillars for an alternative paradigm that is being offered, while the
positivist paradigm for policy analysis is being rejected.

Interpretive/Phenomenological Theory:
Dvora Yanow’s Interpretive Theory
In Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis,’’ Yanow provides what has been
identified by Morçôl as an interpretive/phenomenological theory of policy analysis.
Yanow’s theory focuses on the importance of interpretation to the policy making process.
Although Yanow does not specifically deny the importance or need for quantitative
methods of policy analysis, through her theory, she addresses the eritieism that positivist
theories of policy analysis are impoverished because they fail to take into account the
importance and place of value claims, which entail values, interpretations, and meanings
within the process of policy analysis.
As mentioned earlier, positivist theories of policy analysis consider values, goals, and
problems as given by the deci sion-maker(s) and are believed to be redueible to
quantifiable measurements of physical objects. Thus, positivist theories of policy
analysis see no need to address the notion of multiple interpretations of these elements of
policy within the process of analysis. Yanow, on the other hand, views policy analysis as

^ Dvora Yanow, Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis, vol. 47, Qualitative
Research Methods Series (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003). Reprinted
with permission by Sage Publications, Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis © 2000
by Yanow. Also, used with permission of author, California State University, Hayward,
Department of Public Administration, Carlos Bee Blvd., Hayward, CA 94542-3040.
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a meaning making process in which multiple interpretations of values, goals, problems,
and means must be addressed. As Yanow notes, “As living requires sensemaking, [and]
sensemaking entails interpretations, so too does policy analysis.”*
1. Ontology
Ontologically, Yanow’s interpretive paradigm denies the positivist’s ontological tenet
of the fact-value dichotomy. Although Yanow assumes that there are in general two
categories of things: physical objects and value claims; yet she denies that only physical
objects can yield knowledge. According to Yanow, value claims can also yield
knowledge. Thus, Yanow also denies the positivist's distinction that physical objects are
the sole appropriate objects for inquiry, and that value claims are not appropriate objects
for inquiry.
According to Yanow’s theory, cultural objects can be further divided into two
subeategories: human artifacts and communities of meaning. From human artifacts and
communities of meaning, one can derive value claims that can yield knowledge. As
Yanow explains, “human meanings, values, beliefs, and feelings are embodied in and
transmitted through the artifacts of human creation, such as language, dress, patterns of
action and interaction, written texts, sculpture.”^ And as Yanow continues, according to
hermeneutics, “Human meaning [is] projected into the full range of human artifacts
(language, music, art, literature, architecture, aets and interactions, physical objects, and
so on) by their creators, and these artifacts could be studied to gain knowledge of those
meanings using the same analytic methods that had been developed to understand biblieal

* Ibid., 5.
^ Ibid. 8.
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texts.”'** In addition, according to Yanow, various communities of meaning hold various
interpretations, meanings, values, beliefs, and feelings, and these communities of
meaning can be studied with hermeneutic methods to reveal the various interpretations,
meanings, values, beliefs, and feelings that they hold. Thus, according to Yanow’s
interpretive theory, cultural objects (human artifacts and communities of meaning) can be
studied to yield value claims—interpretations, meanings and values—that can yield
knowledge.
According to Yanow, there are “at least three communities of meaning in any policy
situation: policymakers, implementing agency personnel, and affected citizens or
clients.”" Yet, as Yanow notes, identifying communities of meaning may be more
complicated than simply identifying these three communities, for:
We know from implementation and organizational studies that agencies may
contain any number of internal communities of meaning: directors, managers or
administrators, groups of professionals, lower-level employees, and street level
bureaucrats. And from community studies we know that communities and
neighborhood have internal divisions.... Moreover, there are many other policy
relevant groups— community residents, cognate and competing agencies and
professionals, interest groups, potential clients, unheard or silent voices; which
ones are o f analytic and decision-making concern will depend on the specific
policy issue in question—each one of which may interpret the policy differently
from legislators’ intent (if that can even be established as a single meaning).'^
As we will see later on, identifying these communities of meaning comprises one of the
first two steps in conducting an interpretive policy analysis.

'** Ibid., 6-7.
" Ibid., 10. These ‘communities of meanings’ are also been referred to as
stakeholders in various policy analysis literature.
Ibid., 10-11.
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2. Epistemology
a) Denial of Epistemological Tenet
of the Fact-Value Dichotomy
Epistemologically, Yanow denies the positivist’s epistemological tenet of the factvalue dichotomy. By denying the distinctions between positivist’s characterizations of
physical objects and value claims as knowable and not knowable respectively, Yanow
denies that only physical objects can yield knowledge. Her theory as a whole stands as a
testimonial to the notion that value claims can also yield knowledge. Thus, the denial of
the epistemological tenet of the fact-value dichotomy leads Yanow to consider not only
physical objects, but also value claims—which entail interpretations, meanings, and
values— as appropriate objects of inquiry.
b) Characteristics of Knowledge
In addition, Yanow’s interpretive theory holds that differing communities of meaning
can associate different interpretations, meanings, values, and feelings to both physical
objects and value claims. These communities of meaning suggest the epistemological
tenet that value claims are socially constructed. Given the constructivist epistemological
assumption regarding how we come to know the world around us, and how we come to
communicate with each other, Yanow explains how this process of coming to know the
world, and coming to understand those within it, leads to the creation of communities of
meaning. As Yanow explains:
Through a process o f interaetion, members of a community—whether a
community of scientists or environmentalists or some other group— come to use
the same or similar cognitive mechanisms, engage in the same or similar acts, and
use the same or similar language to talk about thought and action. Group
processes reinforce these, often promoting internal cohesion as an identity marker
with respect to other communities...Such communities may be fluid, ehanging
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from issue to issue (although often with some overlap, e.g., according to positions
along a spectrum of political or religious ideology).'
This tenet entails that the knowledge is a construct; a construct that reflects a certain
framework in which policy issues are interpreted, “an interpretive framework within
which policy-related artifacts makes sense.”'^ Here Yanow argues that various
interpretations of a policy artifact, event, or situation, held by the various communities of
meaning, imply a certain framework that makes sense of the various interpretations. As
Yanow explains, “A ‘frame’—with its metaphoric origins in a picture frame, the
photographer’s framing of a scene through the view finder, the skeletal frame of a house
under construction— sets up an interpretive framework within which policy-related
artifacts make sense.” ' ^
These frames not only make sense of the various interpretations held by the various
communities of meaning, but they also “direct attention toward some elements [of a
policy issue] while simultaneously diverting attention from other elements,” they “entail
courses of action” and they “are often expressed through language.”

As we will see,

revealing the underlying framework of the interpretations of a policy artifact, event, or
situation, which involves the explication of various meanings and values held by the
various communities of meaning, in general beeomes a major task of Yanow’s
interpretive analysis. As Yanow notes, “The central question, then, for interpretive

'3 Ibid., 7-8
Ibid., 11.
Ibid.
Ibid.; Ibid., 12; Ibid., 11-12.
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policy analysts is, How is the policy issue being framed by the various parties to the
debate [the various communities of meaning significant to the policy issue].”'^ Thus,
“the role of the interpretive policy analyst is to map the ‘architecture’ of debate relative to
the policy issue under investigation, by identifying the language and its entailments
(understandings, actions, meanings) used by different interpretive communities in their
framing of the issue.”’* Not only does revealing the underlying framework lead to
understanding the meanings, values, beliefs, and emotions of the various communities of
meaning, it also leads to understanding the conflicts between the various communities of
meaning. 19
In addition, Yanow’s theory of policy analysis assumes that knowledge has a
contextual nature, and is subject to change and is not universally held. As Yanow notes
regarding the knowledge derived from language, objects, and acts, “It is important to
emphasize the contextual nature of such knowledge. Although symbolic meanings need
not necessarily be ‘local’ meanings in a geographic sense, they are ‘local’ in a policy
issue sense. It is also important to note that knowledge it is only provisional knowledge,
subject to change as circumstances and individuals change or as our (mis)interpretations
are corrected, this lack of universality and eternity stands in marked contrast to positivist
notions of the certainty of knowledge.”^**

" Ibid.
18

Ibid., 12-13.

As we will see later on, Yanow’s notion of frame is equivalent to Stone’s notion of
ideas, and Fischer’s notion of ideology.
Ibid., 17.
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It is important to note here that although Yanow holds that knowledge is
characterized by its contextual nature, is subject to change, and is not universally held,
she also holds that the knowledge gained by policy analysts can be objective, in regard to
the truth of the statement, when the knowledge claim is about the second-level
interpretation of interpretations made by the policy analyst within his or her report. In
other words, the analyst’s interpretation of the interpretations held by the various
communities of meaning may be determined to be objectively true or false, based on how
accurately the analyst’s interpretations actually reflect the interpretations held by the
communities of meaning.
c) Tenet of Quasi-Causal Model
of Explanation
A fourth epistemological tenet of Yanow’s interpretive paradigm is that knowledge of
a social phenomenon is centered around deriving knowledge from value claims; from the
intentions, desires, emotions, values, and meanings of the actors associated with that
event. This tenet focuses on the relevance of a quasi-causal model of explanation.
Instead of providing an explanation of social phenomenon in the deductive-nomological
form or the form of probabilistic law, where a certain quantifiable variable is correlated
with another quantifiable variable by virtue of a general law, the interpretive paradigm
assumes that the correlation between two variables, in regard to a social phenomenon, is a
result of the interpretations, meanings, values, and intentions of those involved in the act,
and in interpreting the act as something meaningful.^’

Fay provides an extensive analysis and explanation of the scientific causal model of
explanation and the interpretive quasi-causal model of explanation (Fay, 21-85 passim).
Fay refers to the general law of nature in scientific causal explanations and the desires,
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In Yanow’s paradigm, the tenet regarding the quasi-causal model of explanation is
apparent in her discussion of narrative analysis; one of the primary methods of inquiry
used by interpretive theories. She explains how “narratives relate things that are
understood to have happened.”^^ By relating things that are understood to have
happened, the beliefs and values held by the narrator, and the meanings one associates
with the event or the artifacts of that event are revealed, thus allowing for an explanation
that makes use of interpretations and meanings; an explanation that is not in the mode of
scientific causal explanations.
As Yanow notes, “An interpretive approach to policy analysis, then, is one that
focuses on the meanings of policies, on the values, feelings, or beliefs they express, and
on the process by which those meanings are communicated to and ‘read’ by various
a u d i e n c e s . T h u s , Yanow’s interpretive paradigm primarily focuses on discovering the
quasi-eausal explanations o f social events, while also allowing for the discovery of
scientific causal explanations. This focus is reflected in Yanow’s methodological focus
of understanding the meanings and values behind the rationale for actions that constitute
social events and produce human artifacts. Thus, according to Yanow’s interpretive
theory of policy analysis, although knowledge of physical objects and value claims are
both relevant to the analysis of policy, Yanow holds that one of the main objeetives of
inquiry is to discover the value claims that can yield knowledge.

beliefs, and expectations of the actors in quasi-causal accounts as causal mechanisms.
Fischer also provides an analysis and explanation of these two models of explanation in
Reframing Public Policy (Fischer, 157-59).
Yanow, 58.
Ibid., 14.
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This is significantly different from scientific modes of explanation that positivist
theories of policy analysis rely upon. Scientifie modes of explanation only provide an
explanation of how one variable may be correlated to another variable, and from this they
assume that the mechanisms that correlate these variables are universal laws. This also
leads positivist theories of policy analysis to assume a deterministic conception of people
ruled by universal laws, and leads them to hope for the possibility of social control or
engineering in which variables are manipulated to bring about a certain desired end.
Quasi-causal explanations do not assume that universal laws can explain correlations
among variables. Instead, they provide explanations rooted in various interpretations,
meanings, values, and feelings that are associated with these variables. In this sense, the
actions of people are not determined by social laws, but more so by their beliefs. Thus,
although social engineering may still be possible, the possibility is not rooted in the
manipulation of physical objects, but more so, in the manipulation of value claims—
which entail various values, interpretations, meanings, and feelings—that are associated
with these variables.
3. Methodology
a)

Denial of the Positivist’s Tenet
of the Unity of Science

Entailed by her ontological and epistemological tenets, Yanow provides several
methodological tenets that eomprise a method for what she refers to as an interpretive
theory of policy analysis; a method for acquiring propositions of knowledge that are
rooted in value claims, and are derived from both physical objects—mainly human
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artifacts—and value claims that entail various values, interpretations, and meanings that
are held by various communities of meaning.
Given the distinctiveness of Yanow’s interpretive paradigm from those of the
positivist paradigm, the first methodological tenet held by her theory is the denial of the
positivist’s tenet of the unity of seience. As the whole of Yanow’s methodology argues,
it is false to claim that the logie of scientific inquiry based on natural science applies
universally to all fields regardless of the object in question; that the scientific method of
inquiry is applicable in the study of physical objects that are natural, as well as cultural
objects, such as human artifacts and communities of meaning, and value claims through
the reduction of cultural objects to their physical components, or the reduction of value
claims to variables that can be quantitatively measured.
b) Tenet of Situated Knower
Second, Yanow’s interpretive paradigm holds that policy analysts, like communities
of meaning, are situated knower s. As Yanow notes regarding her interpretive theory of
policy analysis, it is assumed that:
it is not possible for an analyst to stand outside of the policy issue being studied,
free of its values and meanings and of the analyst’s own values, beliefs, and
feelings. The argument assumes that knowledge is acquired through
interpretation, which necessarily is ‘subjective’: it reflects the education,
experience, training, as well as the individual, familial, and communal
background, of the ‘subject’ making the analysis. Not only analysts, but also all
actors in a policy situation (as with other aspects of the social world), interpret
issue data as they seek to make sense of the policy.^'*

Ibid., 6. As noted by Rudner, the word ‘objective’ “has been used, in fact, to apply
to at least four different things: (1) the verisimilitude of ideas, i.e., the replicalike
character of mental imagery, (2) the truth of statements, (3) the reliability of
methodologies, and (4) the psychological disposition of an investigator to have or
believe, or employ the kinds of ideas, statements, or methodologies mentioned under 1, 2,
or 3” (Rudner, 40-41). These various distinctive referents to the word ‘objeetive’ is also
applicable to its polar opposite ‘subjective.’ Yanow’s use of the word ‘subjeetive’ refers
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The implication of Yanow’s tenet that all policy analysts are situated knowers is that
no matter how careful an analyst may believe he or she is being in presenting an objective
or detached analysis of a particular policy and/or policy situation, he or she will not be
able to provide a completely detaehed analysis; the analysis will always be embedded
within the analyst’s own values, beliefs, and feelings.
Methodologically, this tenet helps the analyst keep in mind not only the nature of the
process of analysis but also that of the final product. It implies various levels of
interpretation regarding the analysis of policy, and the reading of the analysis: the firstlevel interpretation, the second-level interpretation of interpretations made by the policy
analyst within his or her report, and the third-level interpretation of the interpretations
made by the reader of the analyst’s reports.^^
e) Mapping Architecture of Policy Discourse
(1)

Steps I and II: Identifying Communities of
Meanings and Artifacts

Third, the interpretive method holds that the first “role of the policy analyst is to map
the ‘architecture’ of debate that is relevant to the policy issue under investigation by
identifying the language and its entailments (understandings, actions, meanings) used by
different interpretive communities in their framing of the issue.”^^ The mapping of the
architecture of the policy relevant issue is done in several steps, and each of these steps

to the psychological disposition of an investigator to have or believe, or employ the kinds
of ideas, statements, or methodologies under 1, 2, or 3.
Yanow, 18.
Ibid., 12-13.
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constitute the steps of the interpretive method of policy analysis. As Yanow explains,
“The first two steps in interpretive policy analysis are to identify the artifaets that are
significant carriers of meaning for the interpretive communities relative to a given policy
issue, and to identify those communities relevant to the policy issue that create or
interpret these artifacts and m e a n i n g s . T h i s amounts to the identification of the
relevant cultural objects, such as human artifacts and communities of meaning, in regards
to the policy issue.
According to Yanow, these two steps of identifying artifacts and communities of
meaning are carried out by: (1) conducting interviews with individuals belonging to the
communities of meaning, (2) observing the communities of meaning, and (3) analyzing
documents or human artifacts produced by communities of meaning that are relevant to
the policy issue.^* As Yanow notes, “When used together, these three methods are often
referred to as participant observation or ethnography.”^^
In addition, it is important to note here that identifying the various communities of
meaning, and the various artifacts of meaning, is focused around accessing local
knowledge. This is an important aspect of interpretive analysis, for it brings to the
forefront the epistemological tenet of multiple perspectives or multiple ways of knowing.
As Yanow states, “interpretive analysts develop and practice an expertise in the
methodical process of accessing local knowledge and mapping the arehitecture of policy

Ibid., 20.
28

Ibid., 31.
Ibid.
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debates, but they treat policy, agency, and community members—the actors in the
situation—as the substantive experts of their own domain.”^**
By doing so, Yanow’s interpretive paradigm also undermines the traditional positivist
notion of the analyst as a privileged knower, or technical expert in a scientific sense, and
provides for a greater understanding of the policy situation—an understanding of poliey
situations from various perspectives that entail various interpretations, meanings, values,
and feelings. Thus, Yanow’s interpretive paradigm provides a more democratic process
of poliey analysis compared to traditional positivist theories of policy analysis. As
Yanow notes:
This approach is more democratic than traditional policy analytic
approaches.. .in two senses. Interpretive analysis depends on the poliey analyst’s
skills as a translator-story teller, not as a technocratic expert, thereby opening up
the conversation to ‘lay’ people (who are often the ones affected by the policy
issue) and short-circuiting the contemporary societal value placed on science and
its technical language. It is also democratic in that it relies on the presence of
multiple stories, told from the points of view, ideally, all policy-relevant actors,
and not only on the stories (and thereby values) of experts, policymakers, or other
elites.^’
It is also important to note here that although Yanow’s theory does not assume a
traditional positivist notion of a privileged, technocratic policy analyst trained in the
methods of scientific inquiry, her theory does assume a certain kind of policy analyst who
is a privileged expert - in listening and in interpreting. By understanding the interpretive
policy analyst as an expert translator-storyteller trained in hermeneutic techniques gives
the analyst a privileged position above their subjects of inquiry. Yet, because her method
does entail the duty of the analyst to map, as accurately as possible the various voices

Ibid., 19.
31

Ibid., 91.
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within a policy issue, her theory still presents a more democratic process of decision
making.
(2) Step III: Explicating Interpretations, Meanings
and Values
The third step in mapping the architecture of the relevant policy issue is “to identify
the communities’ ‘discourses’: how they talk and act with respect to the issue. The goal
of this step is to be able to say something about the meanings—the values, beliefs,
feelings—that are important to each policy relevant community, as well as to extend the
analysis of the a r t i f a c t s . T h i s task in specifically oriented towards discovering
prepositional statements of knowledge that are rooted in value claims that entail various
values, interpretations, and meanings associated with cultural objects.
In mapping the policy-relevant communities’ discourses, the analyst “identif[ies] the
‘discourse’: the specific meanings being communicated through specific artifacts and
their entailments (in thought, speech, and act)” and then “identif[ies] the points of
conflict and their conceptual sources (affective, cognitive, and/or moral) that reflect
different interpretations by different communities.”^^ According to Yanow, the
identification of the discourse is done through the analysis of symbolic language,
metaphor analysis, category analysis, narrative analysis, the analysis of symbolic objects
such as built spaces and their ‘props’ and documents, and the analysis of symbolic acts,
such as rituals and myths.

Ibid., 20.
Ibid., 22, Table 1.1.
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(3)

Step IV: Intervention

A possible second role of the analyst, and a possible fourth step, of Yanow’s
interpretive method for policy analysis constitutes what she refers to as intervention; but
as she notes, this role need not be undertaken by an interpretive analyst, for a researcher
might stop before this point.^'* However, if the analyst chooses to take on this role and
proceed with intervention, Yanow identifies three ways of doing so. The analyst may (1)
“show implications of different meanings/interpretations for policy formulations and/or
action,” (2) “show that differences [or conflicts in meaning] reflect different ways of
seeing [epistemological and ethical differences],” or (3) “negotiate/mediate/intervene in
some other form to bridge differences (e.g., suggest reformulation or reframing [of policy
issues].
d)

Defining Purpose of Policy Analysis

These final possible steps of interpretive policy analysis, and the status of their
necessity, imply a final methodological tenet of interpretive policy analysis— a tenet
regarding the role of the policy analyst and the definition of policy analysis. Traditional
positivist policy analysis has been generally understood as “choosing the ‘best’ policy
alternative according to an explicit decision rule.”^^ Thus, the information provided by
the policy analyst is the decision itself that the decision-maker(s) is to make. In effect,
the analysis entails a choice for the decision-maker(s).

Ibid., 20.
Ibid. 22, Table 1.1.
Jenkins-Smith, 11.
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In contrast, the form of advice provided by Yanow’s interpretive analysis does not
entail a choice for the decision-maker(s). The tenet regarding the role of the analyst for
the interpretive method is that the analyst is “a translator, bringing other interpretive
communities’ stories to her employing policymaker, agency, or community group,
helping each to understand the stories of the others. The task of policy analysis in this
view is to identify and to explain ‘the diverse dimensions of debate pertinent to particular
policy questions’ (Hawkesworth, 1988, p.94), enabling a more informed policy
deliberation and choice.”^^ In this sense, the advice provided by the policy analyst is
understood not as a recommendation as to a specific course of action, but is instead
understood as information that enables the decision-maker(s) to deliberate and choose a
course of action given the information provided by the analysis—in essence the policy
analysis provides the decision-maker(s) with information that he or she may need to
make an adequately informed decision.
This conception of policy analysis is markedly different from positivist policy
analysis’s conception of analysis that is likened to a puzzle, which entails the possibility
of a solution. Yanow’s theory, on the other hand, assumes that the problems of policy
analysis are not necessarily puzzles because they do not necessarily entail solutions.
Although decisions can be made based on the information provided by interpretive
analysts, these decisions are not solutions; they do not necessarily solve the problems
presented by the policy issue. The decisions instead are provisional courses of action.

Yanow, 90.
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Discourse Theory: Deborah Stone’s
Analysis as Craft Theory
In Policy Paradox: The Art o f Political Decision Making, Stone, like Yanow, offers a
theory of policy analysis based on tenets regarding the value-ladenness of policy analysis.
Stone suggests that the terms one uses to define goals, problems, and solutions are
ambiguous, for they have multiple possible interpretations—interpretations that are
rooted in different ways people see and interpret the world—and this in effect is what
characterizes their political and value-laden nature. According to Stone, analysis is not
only a strategically constructed argument for seeing the world a certain way, but in that it
is so, it is also a tool for the construction of reality towards a certain end.^* Thus, it
influences and is influenced by the social construction of reality.
In this sense. Stone’s conception of a policy analyst as one who strategically
constructs arguments for seeing the world a certain way, is in tune with the conception of
an analyst as an advocate, for the analyst’s argument supports one perspective, one set of
interpretations, meanings, and values, among the various perspectives within a poliey
discourse. As Stone notes, “Sharpening your analytic skills will definitely make you a
more effective advocate, so the tools [of Policy Paradox^ are meant to help you develop
both your analyst and your advocate selves.”^^
In addition, according to Stone, she uses the framework of goals, problems, and
solutions “because it expresses a logic of problem solving that is widespread in the policy
analysis literature and because it parallels the [positivist] models of rational deeision-

Stone, 11.
Ibid., 385.
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making and the policy-making process.”'*** What becomes apparent is that Stone’s use of
this specific framework also illustrates that theories of policy analysis that use
frameworks reflecting traditional positivist models of rational decision-making, such as
cost-benefit analysis and risk-benefit analysis, fail to recognize the ambiguous - and thus
political and value-laden nature - of each of these three elements. For according to
Stone, these seemingly straightforward elements of policy analysis contain a myriad of
political complexities that ensue given the nature of society as a polis,"^^ and to deny their
inherent value-laden and ambiguous nature results in an incoherent theory of policy
analysis.
1. Ontology
Ontologically, Stone’s paradigm for policy analysis, like Yanow’s, denies the
ontological tenet of the fact-value dichotomy. She denies that only physical objects are
the appropriate objects for knowledge. According to Stone, we know all objects through
categories of thought; categories of thought which are not physical. As she explains:
Categories are human mental constructs in a world that has only continua.
They are intellectual boundaries we put on the world in order to help us
apprehend it and live in an orderly way. That is the meaning of the phrase ‘social
construction of reality’ and the school of thought it denotes—not that there is no
reality apart from social meanings, but that we can know reality only by
categorizing it, naming it, and giving it meaning.'*^
Thus, unlike Yanow, Stone believes that all knowledge, although some are
derived from physical objects, can only be knowledge when their value claims are

"**Ibid., 12.
41

The polis is Stone’s reference to an “essential political society” (Ibid., 18).
Ibid., 378.
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explicated, which entail the explication of interpretations, meanings, and values. As
Stone notes, “facts do not exist independent of interpretive lenses, and they come
clothed in words and numbers. Even the simple act of naming an object places it in a
class and suggests that it is like something and unlike others.”'*^ Thus, knowledge
claims are always only known to us as propositional statements rooted in value claims
that entail various values, interpretations, and meanings.
Within her theory of poliey analysis. Stone makes three general distinctions
within the category of thought that are assumed to be important to policy analysis—
the categories of problems, goals, and solutions. As we shall see later on, she
provides methods for gaining knowledge, which are rooted in value claims, of each of
these three categories based on their ambiguous and therefore, value-laden nature.
2. Epistemology
a)

Denial of the Epistemological Tenet
Of the Fact-Value Dichotomy

Stone, like Yanow, also rejects the epistemological tenet of the fact-value dichotomy,
assuming that the appropriate objects of inquiry for policy analysis are value claims. She
notes that policy analysis is not concerned with facts (the knowledge gained and
supported by physical objects), but instead by value claims (the various interpretations,
meanings, and values) espoused within differing interpretations of goals, problems, and
solutions that are dependant upon contextual influences of the mind, history, rhetoric, and
power. As Stone explains, “There are to be sure, objective facts underlying all [policy
relevant] situations. The fetus could probably be described as consisting of certain kinds

Ibid., 311.
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of tissues, with determinable weight, chemieal composition, and anatomical formation.
But these kinds of facts are simply not the ones that matter in politics. What people care
about are interpretations of personhood, shootings, wars, and economies. What
communities decide about when they make policy is meaning, not matter. And [natural]
science cannot settle questions of [contemporary political or social] meaning.”'*'*
b)

Characteristics of Knowledge

In addition, like Yanow, Stone holds a constructive notion of knowledge. According
to Stone, given that soeiety exists as a polis, information or knowledge is dependent on
interpretation and is an object of strategic manipulation. This tenet points to the tenet,
like Yanow’s conception of a framework that makes sense of human artifacts, that
underlining our knowledge is a background of interpretations that make sense of the
knowledge we have. As Stone notes, “Each idea is an argument, or more accurately a
collection of arguments in favor of a different way of seeing the world. Every chapter [of
Policy Paradox^ is devoted to showing how there are multiple understandings of what
appears to be a single concept, how these understandings are created, and how they are
manipulated as part of political strategy.”'*^
Also, according to Stone, “Much of what we ‘know’ is what we believe to be true.
And what we believe about information depends on who tells us (source) and how it is
presented (the medium, the choice of language, the context).”'*^ Thus, Stone concludes
not only that knowledge is never complete nor is it ever fully and equally distributed.

'*^ Ibid., 379.
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Ibid., 11.

'*^ Ibid., 28.
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because the information we base our knowledge upon is never fully complete nor equally
distributed,'*^ but it is also ‘subjective’ in regard to the truth of statements.'**
c) Tenet of Quasi-Causal Modes
of Explanation
Finally, although Stone does not refer specifically to quasi-causal modes of
explanation, her theory as a whole, like Yanow’s, stands as a testimonial to the
importance of quasi-causal modes of explanation. As we will see in the following
section, one of Stone’s major methodological tenets is based on the notion of
deconstructing alternative policy discourses. The act of doing so, according to Stone, is
focused around explicating the various interpretations of goals, problems, and solutions,
along with the various value claims, which entail various meanings and values that are
associated with various interpretations.
One example of this is the act of deconstructing narratives. As Stone explains,
narratives “provide explanations of how the world works.”'*^ Although narratives
themselves are quasi-causal explanations, the result of deconstructing narratives is also a
quasi-causal explanation of why various policy advocates understand the policy problem
in the way that they do, and why they support one policy alternative in respect to another.
Thus, Stone’s theory, like Yanow’s, stresses the importance of quasi-causal modes of
explanation.

'*^ Ibid., 29.
'** Rudner, 40-41.
'*^Stone, 137.
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3.

Methodology

a) Tenet of Situated Knower
Stone’s theory of policy analysis, like Yanow’s, also assumes that the subject of
knowledge is situated within his or her own framework of interpretations, meanings, and
values. As mentioned above in the section on Stone’s characteristics of knowledge.
Stone believes that our knowledge is based on ideas that are a collection of arguments on
how one sees the world. These ideas are the underlying frames for what we know, and as
Stone continues to explain, much of what we know is based on what we believe to be
true, and what we believe to be true is based primarily on our sources of information and
mediums of information. Thus, as subjects of knowledge, we are embedded within a
framework of ideas, which are gathered from various sources through various mediums
of exchange. Thus, like Yanow, Stone concludes that the product of analysis also entails
a framework of meanings, interpretations, and values that must be analyzed, or as Stone
may put it, deconstructed.
b) Ambiguity and Value-Ladenness
of Goals
Stone holds three major methodological tenets. The first is the tenet that goals, a
category of thought, are by nature ambiguous and thus, value-laden and political. In
“Part II” of Policy Paradox, Stone addresses the ambiguous nature of goals in her
analysis of equity, efficiency, security, liberty, and community ‘goals’. According to
Stone, the notion of a goal, also referred to as an objective or a value, “conveys the
central tenet of modem policy analysis—namely, that policy is the rational attempt to

64

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

attain objectives,”^**and they are used not only to justify policy but also as a criterion for
evaluation.^* As Stone notes, the unifying fact of the treatment of goals in positivist
theories of policy analysis is that they “search for a single definition or single criterion
that can offer a determinant rule for justification or evaluation.”^^ However, as she
argues, “None of these criteria in fact offers a simple or determinant rule. Each of them
contains ambiguities and problems of interpretation that make them the object of political
s t r u g g l e s . T h e s e ambiguities are rooted in value claims that entail various
interpretations, meanings, and values that are associated with the conception of goals.
For example, she explains how the notion of ‘equity’ can carry various meanings.
She notes how the notions of ‘equity’ and ‘equality’ are conceptions of distribution,^'* and
they contain “three important dimensions: the recipients (who gets something?), the item
(what is being distributed?), and the process (how is the distribution to be decided and
carried out?).”^^ As Stone continues, each of these dimensions present challenges to the
positivist’s conception of a value-neutral policy analysis.
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Ibid.
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^'* Stone uses the word ‘equality’ “to denote sameness and to signify the part of a
distribution that contains uniformity - uniformity of slices, or of meals, or of voting
power, for example”, and she uses ‘equity’ “to denote distributions regarded as fair, even
though they contain both equalities and inequalities” (Ibid., 42). Cf. Aristotle, Ethica
Nicomachea, Bk V.
55

Ibid.

65

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The dimension of the recipient presents two challenges. The first is the challenge of
how one is to define the membership within the class of recipients, and the second is a
challenge to how society is internally divided, either horizontally or vertically or by
group.

To exemplify the first challenge. Stone offers the notion of citizenship. As

Stone explains:
On the first thought, one might think a citizen [of the United States] is anyone
bom on American soil or bom of American parents or legally naturalized. But
once we think about the different purposes and policies for which we need a
concept of citizenship, the definition becomes less obvious. When the right to
vote is at issue, it is often believed that people should meet certain qualifications
to be considered voting citizens. They should know how to read so that they can
follow policy debates (literacy test); they should own property so that they ‘have a
stake in the system’ (property qualification); or they should reside in the
jurisdiction a certain length of time so that they ‘understand the issue’ (residency
requirements).^^
The second challenge is exemplified by the two conceptions of equity in the field of
economics, horizontal and vertical equi t y.Horizontal equity is defined as “equal
treatment of people within the same rank” and vertical equity is defined as “unequal
treatment of people in different ranks.”^^
The second dimension of equity or equality, the dimension of the item, presents
challenges of defining the item being distributed.^^ These challenges entail defining
boundaries of the item or defining the item’s value. As Stone illustrates:

56

Ibid., 43.

57

Ibid., 42.

58

Ibid., 43.

59

Ibid.

60

Ibid., 45.

66

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Student financial aid is an issue involving boundary challenges to the
definition of the item. A few schools give aid strictly on the basis of students’
academic merit. But most distribute aid at least in part on the basis of students’
financial need. When a school considers financial need, it is looking at its
financial aid—what it distributes—not as money in itself but as part of each
student’s total assets. It then has to decide what to count as a student’s asset.
Some schools look only at the student’s current earnings and savings. Others take
a more global view and include parents’ earnings and savings. Law, medical, and
business schools typically consider their students’ high potential future earnings
as part of their assets, and tend to offer loans rather than outright scholarships, on
the theory that their students can easily pay back loans out of their future
earnings. Thus, within the issue of financial aid, we have at least four possible
definitions of what is being distributed: aid as money itself, aid as part of a
student’s assets, aid as part of a family’s assets, and aid as part of a student’s
lifetime earning.^’
The third dimension of equity or equality, the dimension of process, presents
challenges to the process of obtaining equity or equality. As Stone notes, “Process is
important because our notion of fairness includes not only the end result but the sense of
fair process by which the result occurred. Thus, if after hearing testimony in a criminal
case, the jury flipped a coin to decide whether to convict, we would think the trial unfair
even if it resulted in a decision we believed was in accord with the evidence. For many
things in life— such as prize lottery, an election, or an athletic competition—we are quite
willing to accept unequal results so long as we know that the process is fair.”^^
Thus, in assuming that goals, which are characterized in terms of values such as
equity, efficiency, security, liberty, and community ‘goals,’ are consistent with a single
definition or criterion, positivist theories not only deny the possibility of conflicting
definitions, but in unquestionably accepting these definitions determined by the analyst or
decision-maker(s), the analyst unquestionably supports a specific conception or

Ibid., 49-50.
Ibid., 51-52.
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interpretation of these goals. By doing so, the positivist paradigm not only falsely
assumes that there are no ambiguities in the analysis of policy, but also supports and
reifies a set o f values, interpretations, and meanings associated with only one perspective
among the various perspectives within the policy discourse.
c) Ambiguity and Value-Ladenness
of Problems
Stone’s second methodological tenet is that the notion of problems, another category
of thought belonging to the social realm, is inherently ambiguous and political, and thus,
value-laden and political. In “Part III” of Policy Paradox, Stone addresses the
ambiguous and political nature of problems in her analysis of the types of language used
for defining and portraying policy problems. According to Stone, positivist theories of
policy analysis define a problem as “a statement of a goal and the discrepancy between it
and the status quo.”^^ However, in her analysis of how symbols and numbers are used,
and how causes, interests, and decisions are portrayed. Stone explains how “problem
definition is never simply a matter of defining goals, and measuring our distance from
them. It is rather the strategic representation of situations. Problem definition is a matter
of representation because every description of a situation is a portrayal from only one of
many points o f view. Problem definition is strategic because groups, individuals, and
government agencies deliberately and consciously fashion portrayals to promote their
favorite course o f action.

“ Ibid., 133.
64

Ibid.

68

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

According to Stone, (1) symbols, (2) numbers, (3) causes, (4) interests and (5)
decisions all represent types of language used in portraying and defining policy problems;
in creating quasi-causal explanations of problems. All five types of language used in
portraying and defining problems are dependent upon various values and interpretations
of meaning, thus they are ambiguous, and so political and value-laden.
As Stone explains about (1) symbols, there are “four aspects of symbolic
representation [that] are especially important to the definition of problems”: (a) narrative
stories, (b) synecdoches, (c) metaphors, (d) and ambiguity.

As Stone continues to

explain, (a) narratives “provide explanations of how the world works”; (b) ^'’Synecdoches
are figures of speech in which a part is used to represent a whole”; (c) metaphors is the
comparison of two things as similar or alike; and {àyAmbiguity, [is] the capacity to have
multiple meanings”,^^ as we saw with the examples regarding citizenship and student
financial aide. All four aspects of symbolic representation denote the ambiguous, and
thus, value-laden and political nature of symbols.
(1) Numbers, as Stone explains, “is about the language of counting’, and ‘Counting is
at bottom metaphor-making, because to count requires making judgments about how
things are like one another in important ways.”^^ Thus, the uses of numbers, in the
portrayal of problems, reflect various interpretations of how the numbers correlate to
those things that are being counted.

Ibid., 137.
Ibid.
Ibid., 134.
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In regards to (3) Causes, Stone notes that, “In the polis, causal stories are
strategically crafted with symbols and numbers and then asserted by political actors who
try to make their versions the basis of poliey c h o i c e s . T h u s , causes reflect quasi-causal
explanations rooted in various interpretations of symbols and numbers.
Of (4) interests. Stone explains that, “The sides in politics are said to be ‘interests.’
They are groups that have a stake in an issue or are affected by it.. .Interests, in the
language of politics, are the active side of effects, the result of people experiencing or
imaging effects and attempting to influence them.”^^ Thus, interests reflect various
values, interpretations, and meanings that are associated with the various interests held by
the various stakeholders.
In regard to (5) decisions. Stone explains that:
The hallmark of contemporary [positivist] policy analysis is its focus on rational
methods of decision making. Problems are cast as a choice between alternative
means for achieving a goal, and rationality means simply choosing the best means
to attain a given goal.
In this approach, all policy problems become subspecies of a single meta
problem: how to make a decision that will attain a given goal. These models of
decision are prescriptive rather than descriptive or predictive; they define policy
problems as decisions, and they purport to show the best decision to solve a
problem.^*^
Thus, decisions also entail various values and interpretations of meaning, not only
because choosing the ‘best’ means involves one to determine which value to use in order
to measure which means is the ‘best’, or to provide a hierarchy o f ‘best’ means, but also

Ibid., 189.
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because the understanding of the problem for which the decision is to provide a solution,
also entails various values and interpretations of meaning.
d) Ambiguity and Value-Ladenness
of Solutions
Stone’s third methodological tenet is that the notion of solutions is also by nature
ambiguous, and thus, value-laden and political. In “Part IV,” Stone addresses the
ambiguous nature of solutions, also referred to as policy strategies, or policy instruments.
As Stone argues, “The means of tackling policy problems are often called policy
instruments or policy solutions. These terms give the misleading impression that public
polices create permanent mechanical fixes. Policy actions, though, are ongoing strategies
for structuring relationships and coordinating behavior to achieve collective purpose.”^'
As Stone continues, solutions or policy instruments, are always about the use of power,
about “getting people to do what they otherwise might not do” either through
inducements, rules, the portrayal of facts, the use of rights talk, and/or the manipulation
of power.
As Stone argues throughout this section, the choice and implementation of these
policy instruments are subject to the struggles of politics, the struggles of a value-laden
world. Thus, in determining a specific solution as the ‘best,’ positivist theories deny all
other conceptions of solutions, along with the values that these differing conceptions
encompass. Not only this, but in unquestionably aecepting the solution recommended by

Ibid., 261.
Ibid.
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the analyst, one not only accepts a structure of power, but also a specific conception of
human behavior, structural relationship, and values.
e) Denial of Positivist Tenet
of Unity of Scienee
Another methodological tenet held by Stone’s theory of policy analysis as craft is the
tenet regarding a specific definition of policy analysis. This tenet entails the denial of the
positivist’s tenet of the unity of science. According to Stone, policies contain ideas and
“Each idea is an argument, or more accurately a collection of arguments in favor of
different ways of seeing the world.

These ideas are arguments that are instrumental in

the way one interprets and understands the world. In addition, according to Stone, “Ideas
are a medium of exchange and a mode of influence even more powerful than money,
votes and guns.. .Ideas are at the center of political conflict. Policy making, in turn, is a
constant struggle over criteria for classification, the boundaries of categories, and the
definition of ideals that guide the way people behave.”^"* Thus, “policy is centrally about
classification and differentiation, about how we do and should categorize in a world
where categories are not given”,^^ and questions regarding categorization, how to classify
and what to classify, are not only fundamental struggles of politics, but also, are
fundamental challenges in policy analysis. Thus, the analysis of policy requires a set of
tools that are different from the set of tools used in natural science.
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f)

Defining Purpose of Policy Analysis

Finally, in this view of policy analysis, the whole of policy analysis entails
ambiguous notions of values and various interpretations of meaning. Thus, Stone holds
that policy analysis is a deconstructive act of revealing these various interpretations and
meanings behind alternative policy perspectives, as well as a constructive act of making
arguments for one’s own perspective—one’s own interpretations, meanings, and values.
As Stone puts it, “analysis is itself a creature of politics; it is a strategically crafted
argument, designed to create ambiguities and paradoxes and to resolve them in a
particular direction.”^^
As a strategically crafted argument, a policy analysis is meant to advocate a specific
way of understanding and interpreting the policy situation; the analyst is meant to give
voice to a specific discourse within the various discourses regarding the specific policy
issue. As Stone notes in her example of Policy Paradox in action, “I use the tools of
Policy Paradox to help me think of the issues, analyze and critique the arguments of the
other side, and argue persuasively for what 1 believe”, “I invite you, readers, to
deconstruct both positions and to argue on your own for what you believe.”’’ In this
conception of policy analysis. Stone, like Yanow, does not liken policy analysis to a
puzzle. The analyst here is not a puzzle solver that offers solutions to the policy
problems, instead they are political advocates who argue for courses of action that the
analyst personally believes to be good or right.
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Also, as Stone notes regarding decision-analysis strategies of problem definition for
her model of decision-making, the analyst should: (1) “state goals ambiguously and
possibly keep some goals secret or hidden’; (2) ‘Be prepared to shift goals and redefine
goals as the political situation dictates’; (3) ‘Keep undesirable alternatives off the agenda
by not mentioning them’; (4) ‘Make your preferred alternative appear to be the only
feasible or possible one’; (5) ‘Focus on one part of the causal chain and ignore others that
would require politically difficult or costly policy actions’; (6) ‘Use rhetorical devices to
blend alternatives’; (7) ‘Don’t appear to make a clear decision that could trigger strong
opposition’; (8) ‘Select from the infinite range of consequences only those whose cost
and benefits will make your preferred course of action look “best”’; and (9) ‘Choose the
course of action that hurts powerful constituents the least, but portray your decision as
creating maximal social good for a broad public.”’*
It is apparent from these suggestions, that Stone’s view of policy analysis is focused
around the analyst’s own perspective and his or her ability to make the strongest
argument for his or her way of viewing the policy situation. In essence, one of the main
goals of the policy analyst, in Stone’s perspective, is to shut out through seemingly
reasoned criticism alternative views to a policy situation in order to advocate the
analyst’s own views - in order to get the analyst’s representation of the problem, goal,
and recommendation for a solution - accepted as the appropriate analysis for the issue at
hand. Stone’s theory in the hands of an elite few can be understood as a Machiavellian
view of policy analysis, and in the hands of the many, can be understood as an adversarial
view of policy analysis.
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Critical Theory: Frank Fischer’s
Discursive Theory
In Evaluating Public Policy and in Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and
Deliberative Practices

Fischer presents what he refers to as a postempiricist theory of

policy analysis. Yet, it is important to note that the category of postempiricism is a larger
and more general category that may also include Yanow’s interpretive theory and Stone’s
theory of analysis as craft.**’ Thus, to maintain the conceptual distinetion among these
three theories, this thesis refers to Fischer’s theory as a discursive theory of policy
analysis.
Unlike Yanow’s and Stone’s theories of policy analysis, Fischer’s discursive theory is
rooted in the notion of integrating empirical and normative methods of inquiry for
gaining social knowledge. Fischer holds both empirical and normative aspects of policy
analysis as important to analysis as a whole. As we will see in Fischer’s methodology, he
attributes each type of inquiry to a specific level of discourse. In his theory, empirical
analysis is attributed to the first level of Analytic-Technical Discourse;, and normative
analysis comprises the remaining three levels of Contextual Discourse, Systemic
Discourse, and Ideological Discourse respectively (see below, pp. 85 ff).
1. Ontology
Fischer’s discursive theory, like Yanow’s and Stone’s, also denies the ontological
tenet of the fact-value dichotomy. As Fischer explains of his postempiricist paradigm,
the general paradigm of his theory, “The starting point for a postempiricist discursive

Frank Fischer, Evaluating Public Policy (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Inc., 1995).
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alternative to contemporary [positivist] policy inquiry begins with the recognition that the
human and physical realms are inherently different...Whereas physical objects have no
intrinsic meaning structures, human actors actively construct their social worlds. They do
so by assigning meaning to events and actions, both physical and social. Human
experience, as such, is enveloped in a non-material social, cultural, and personal realm of
thoughts and meaning.”*' Thus, Fischer, like Yanow and Stone, focuses on the thoughts
and meaning—what has been referred to as value claims in the sections on Yanow and
Stone—as the appropriate objects of inquiry for policy analysis. Fischer, like Yanow and
Stone, also assumes that those thoughts and meanings (value claims), are knowable, and
are central to the analysis of poliey. As Fischer explains:
This understanding of social reality has profound import for the way we
approach the study of social and political inquiry. Based on social meaning—
motives, intentions, goals, purposes, values, and so forth—social action is
constructed through language and, as such, its analysis has more in common with
history and literature than with physical science. Rather than seeking proofs
through formal logic and empirical experimentation, the investigation of social
action requires the use of metaphoric processes that pull together and connect
different experiences based on perceived similarities. The meaning of soeial
experience is assessed in terms of its position in the larger patterns of which it is a
part, be it a situation, a social system, or an ideology.*’
2.

Epistemology

a)

Denial of the Epistemological Tenet
o f the Fact-Value Dichotomy

Fischer, like Yanow and Stone, also denies the epistemological tenets that positivist
theories o f p o lic y an a ly sis assu m e are entailed b y the on tological tenet o f the fact-valu e
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dichotomy. As Fischer notes regarding the epistemological tenet of the fact-value
dichotomy, what he refers to as the ‘objective-subjective dualism’, “Stressing the
subjective foundations of social reality, postempiricist scholars seek to overcome the
objective-subjective dualism imposed by ‘positivist’ or ‘neopositivist’ epistemological
doctrines.”*’ Thus, like Yanow and Stone, Fischer concludes non-material thoughts and
meanings (value claims), are appropriate objects of inquiry and can yield knowledge.
According to Fischer, “ ‘Facts’ are always ‘theory-laden’ and thus rest on interpretations.
Emphasizing the integration of normative and empirical modes of discourse,
postempiricist understand the discursive processes of confirmations and falsification as
complex activities involving a whole network of assumptions, hypotheses, competing
theories, even research programmes [sic], rather than singular hypotheses subject to
direct empirical test (Sabia and Wallulis 1983: 15-16).”*'* Thus, the acquisition of
knowledge entails uncovering the various values, interpretations, and meanings
associated with facts.
b) Characteristics of Knowledge
In addition, like Yanow and Stone, epistemologically, Fischer’s discursive theory
holds what he refers to as a social constructionist epistemology. As Fischer explains:
Social constructionism refers to the varying ways in which the social realities of
the world are shaped and perceived (Gergen 1999). Although there are theoretical
differences among those who call themselves social constructionists, they share a
common concern for how people assign meaning to the world.
The idea of social constructionism has its origins in the sociology of
knowledge (Berger and Luckman 1967; Mannheim 1936). Most basically, it is an
inquiry into the ways objects are seen through different mental structures or world
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views, how they are interpreted in different social circumstances and understood
during different historical periods.*’
Social constructionism, according to Fischer, “starts with the recognition o f the
theoretical ladenness of facts. This interpretive position holds that social reality and
empirical observations of it only exist in the context of a mental framework (a construct)
for thinking about them. Social constructs or mental frameworks are grounded in values
that determine our perceptions of reality.”*^ This tenet regarding a mental framework,
grounded in value claims, is similar to Yanow’s conception of frameworks that make
sense of human artifacts, and Stone’s conception of ideas. Yet, unlike Yanow—who
assumes a distinction between physical objects that are natural and ones that are cultural,
which leads her to believe that facts can be understood independently of values—Fischer,
like Stone, assumes that all facts are ultimately value-laden. Facts are always associated
with value claims that must be explicated in order to be knowledge. Thus, according to
Fischer, like Stone, facts alone are not propositional statements of knowledge.
Fischer’s discursive paradigm, unlike Yanow and Stone, also holds that knowledge is
characterized by consensus. As Fischer puts it, knowledge is more a matter of
“consensually ‘accepted belief than proof or demonstration.”*’ According to Fischer, it
is only when the multiple perspectives of various understandings or interpretations of a
physical objects, or non-material thoughts and meanings (value claims), or events come
together in a dialeetical process and form a consensus that knowledge is established. As

*’ Ibid., 53.
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Fischer explains, “Given the perspectival nature of categories through which social and
political phenomena are observed, knowledge of a social object can be better understood
as something that emerges more from discursive interaction—or dialectical clash—of
competing interpretations. Whereas consensus under empiricism is inductively anchored
in the reproduction of objective tests and statistical confirmation, consensus under
postempiricism is approached through the discursive construction of synthesis of
competing views (Danziger 1995).”**
Fischer also notes that knowledge, or the consensual belief established through a
dialectical clash, must be supported, or warranted by other beliefs or judgments, as with
any argument in informal logic. As Fischer explains it, policy analysis:
seeks to bring a wider range of contextually sensitive evidence and arguments to
bear on the problem or position under investigation. As Hawkesworth (1988)
explains, the reasons provided in support of alternatives organize evidence,
marshal data, apply explanatory criteria, address multiple levels of argumentation,
and employ various strategies of presentation....Through the process of
deliberation and debate, a consensus emerges among particular researchers
concerning what would be taken as valid explanation. Although the choice is
sustained by reasons that can be articulated and advanced as support for the
inadequacy of alternative interpretations, it is the practical judgment of the
community of researchers and not the data themselves that establishes the
accepted explanation [or knowledge].*^
Fischer also assumes what he refers to as a “‘coherence’ theory of reality that
emphasizes the finite and temporally bounded character of knowledge.”^** As Fischer
further explains, “In contrast to the ‘correspondence’ theory, which takes scientific
concepts to directly correspond to the empirical referents of reality, the coherence theory

Ibid.
*^ Ibid., 134.
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addresses the indeterminedness [5zc] of empirical positions.”^' Although Fischer refers to
this as a coherence theory of reality, it is more accurately referred to as the eoherence
theory of truth.
Yet, Fischer’s conception o f knowledge is similar to the coherence theory of truth,
there is some distinction. According to Laurence BonJour, the coherence theory of truth
is “the view that the nature of truth [or knowledge] or the sole criterion of determining
truth [or knowledge] is constituted by a relation of coherence between belief (or
judgment) being assessed and other beliefs (or judgments).”^’ As BonJour continues to
explain, “coherence is intended to be a substantially more demanding relation than mere
consistency, involving such things as inferential or explanatory relations within the
system of beliefs.”^’
It may be said that there is coherence involved in Fischer’s conception of knowledge;
to say that the belief is supported by evidence through inferential reasoning is to say that
the belief is inferentially established to cohere or interconnect with other beliefs, and
although the logical outcome may be that these interconnections establish a system of
beliefs, Fischer supplies no indication that his conception of knowledge must belong to
one entire coherent system of beliefs. As we will see in the following section on
methodology, these tenets regarding the character of knowledge have significant
implications for Fischer’s methods of policy analysis.
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Moreover, Fischer continues to explain that, “as long as there remains the possibility
of further confrontation with other points of view, the construction of a consensus is
never finished or complete.”’*'* Therefore, according to Fischer’s understanding of
knowledge, we are constantly in the process of creating knowledge through the process of
hermeneutic dialectics, and constantly seeking a deeper and wider consensus. Thus, like
Yanow and Stone, he assumes that knowledge always remains a construct and is always
subject to change; it is never complete and is temporal.
c) Tenet of Both Scientific Causal and
Quasi-Causal Modes of Explanation
A third epistemological tenet of Fischer’s theory is that knowledge entails both
scientific causal modes of explanation and quasi-causal modes of explanation. Fischer
notes in the above passage how social constructs or mental frameworks are grounded in
‘subjective’ experiences and understandings of the social and physical realms. This tenet
leads Fischer, unlike Yanow and Stone, to the conclusion that knowledge of an event
entails both scientific causal modes of explanation and quasi-causal modes of
explanation. According to Fischer:
While empiricist social scientists stress the analysis of cause-effect relationships,
they seldom establish any such relationship. Empirical analysts generally uncover
statistical correlations between events, but are unable to prove that one eaused the
other (that is, that A appeared before B and thus made B happen). Statistical
correlations can show only that two or more variables move together in a
particular way, but it offers no evidence about causality...
To move beyond the empiricists’ statistical relationships in effort to have a
closer look at ‘what causes what,’ that is, the ‘causal mechanism’, we have only
one alternative—namely, interpretive analysis (Linn 1998). Whereas a causal (or
statistical) relationship tells us which variables are involved, and something about
the direction in which they move, only a closer qualitative analysis can offer us
94
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statements about how and why these variables are connected. Only through
interpretive methods can we discover the various possible [quasi-causal]
explanations of what particular actors thought they were doing when they
engaged in the actions pertinent to causal relationships.”’
Thus, according to Fischer, “The empirical data of neopositivist consensus can be turned
into knowledge only through interpretive interaction with the other perspectives. Only by
examining the data through conflicting frameworks or standpoints can unrecognized and
hidden suppositions that give it meaning be uncovered and exposed.””^ By revealing the
hidden suppositions through quasi-causal modes of explanation, one can more fully
understand the object or the event described by scientific causal modes of explanation.
3. Methodology
a) Denial of Positivist Tenet
Of the Unity of Science
Given his intent on integrating positivist and interpretive methods for policy analysis,
Fischer’s theory, like Yanow’s and Stone’s, denies the positivist’s methodological tenet
of the unity of science. As Fischer explains;
Adamantly rejected is the idea that a unified understanding of science
methodology can be applicable to all research questions. Underlying this
commitment is a rejection of the possibility of neutral observational vocabulary
that can be used to test and conclusively prove or falsity explanatory hypotheses.
‘Facts’ are always ‘theory-laden’ and thus rest on interpretations.”’
Within this rejection of the positivist’s conception of the unity of science, we can
identify another distinction when comparing Stone’s and Fischer’s theories with
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Yanow’s. Yanow does not assume that the methods of inquiry for physical objects that
are natural need qualitative methods to yield knowledge, although she maintains that
knowledge from both the natural sciences and the social sciences are constructs. She
only maintains that the kind of method for inquiry for policy analysis is different from
those of the natural sciences. Stone and Fischer, on the other hand, assume that all
inquiry, including inquiry into the natural science, is value-laden. Thus, Stone’s and
Fischer’s rejection of the positivist’s conception of the unity of science is underscored by
their acceptance of a different conception of the unity of science—that all inquiry,
whether natural or social, entails methods of uncovering values, interpretations, and
meanings.
b)

Tenet of Situated Knower

One tenet of Fischer’s theory, shared by Yanow and Stone, is that of a situated
knower. This is the tenet that the subjects of understanding are situated within their own
mental framework. As Fischer cites, ‘“ The human subjects have preselected and
preinterpreted this world by a series of commonsense constructs which determine their
behavior, define the goal of their actions [and] the means available—which help them
find their bearings in their natural and socio-cultural environment and come to grips with
it’ (Schütz 1962; 5-6).””* According to this passage, the subject of knowledge has a
preselected and preinterpreted understanding of this world; an understanding based on
commonsense constructs that form the subject’s mental framework, and this mental
framework determines their behavior, defines the goals of their actions and the means
available to them. This preselection and preinterpretation locates the subject within a
98
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specific contextual time and place of history and experiences, and is entailed by one’s
ideology. For Fischer, like Yanow and Stone, the implication of a situated knower is that
the frame of reference must be explicated within the process of policy analysis. Fischer
does this throughout his final three levels of policy discourse.
c) Tenet of Hermeneutic Dialectics
Second, Fischer’s theory holds that social “knowledge has to be acquired through a
process of hermeneutic dialectics.’’”” As Fischer continues to explain:
Hermeneutics refers to the interpretive role in the formulation of subjective
interpretations about reality. Basic to this interpretive process, as Gadamer
(1976:15) puts it, is an appropriation of ‘the unknown with the known through a
process of constructive understanding’. Stated simply, we understand things by
fitting them into patterns of knowledge, events, and actions that we already
possess, typically in narrative form, or that are at least available to us as members
of a particular society. Dialectics is a logic that seeks to represent the
confrontation of subjective interpretations with other interpretations. The goal of
a dialectical clash among various interpretations is a constructive synthesis that
leads to a new inter-subjective understanding. Dialectic hermeneutics is a process
whereby ‘groups must confront and deal with the constructions of others’ in
pursuit of a.new consensual understanding (Lincoln and Guba 1989:41).
Knowledge for the social constructionist is thus forged through dialectically
generated consensus.'””
(1) Level of Analytic-Technical Discourse:
Program Verification
According to Fischer, hermeneutic dialectics is approached through four levels of
discourse: (1) technical-analytic discourse, (2) contextual discourse, (3) systemic
discourse, and (4) ideological discourse. The first (1) level of analytic-technical
discourse occurs through the process of program verification. As Fischer notes, program
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verification “focuses on the program objectives of a public policy.”' ”' This level of
discourse subsumes quantitative methods of inquiry. It is specifically concerned with: (a)
whether the program proposed by the policy empirically fulfills its predetermined
objective(s), (b) whether empirical analysis uncovers secondary or unanticipated effeets
that offset the program’s predetermined objective(s), and (c) whether the program fulfills
the objective(s) more efficiently than alternative means available.'”’ This process is
essentially oriented towards gaining facts from physical objects. They involve
experimental evaluative research,'”’ which “represents the formal application of the
scientific method to the social action context of public programs”, '”'* or through quasiexperimental evaluation.
(a)

Experimental Evaluation

Experimental evaluation research entails: (1) “the specification of one or more
programmatic objectives as a criterion for analysis’; (2) finding and developing
‘quantitative indicators that appropriately measure [the programmatic objectives]’; (3)
determining ‘the appropriate target population and the corresponding sample for the
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evaluation’; '”’ and (4) analyzing ‘the data collected after the experiment has been carried
out.”'””
Concerning the first step of (1) identifying objectives, Fischer notes that, “Ideally,
such objectives are determined by the legislation that authorizes the program (Sylvia,
Meier, Gunn, 1991). [Although,] in fact, however, enabling statutes are often rather
broad and ambiguous, and the specific objectives may be set by program administrators
rather than legislators.”' ”’
In regard to the second step of (2) finding or developing indicators that appropriately
measure the specified objectives, Fischer notes that, “The choice of indicators, the extent
of their application, and the duration of the research is governed by the purpose of the
evaluation, the resources available to the evaluator, the time constraints on the
completion o f the research, and the nature of the program under examination.”' ”* He also
notes that the measurement of these indicators is done through standardized tests, survey
questionnaires, closed-end interviews, or secondary sources such as complaint files and
per capita uses of a service.'””
In regard to the third step of (3) determining the target population and the
corresponding sample, according to Fischer, after the target group and sample has been

' ”’ As noted by Fischer, “The target population is defined in terms of the program
under consideration; the sample is chosen to represent the population (Fitz-Gibbons et al.,
1987)” (Ibid., 29).
106

Ibid., 28-29.

'”’ Ibid., 29.
' ”* Ibid.
109

Ibid.

86

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

determined the evaluator will ideally divide the sample group into two randomly selected
equivalent groups, one of the groups would be the ‘experimental group’ and the other
would be the ‘control group’. " ” As Fischer notes, the purpose of the control group is to
“assure that the effeetiveness of the program is measured rather than other extraneous
variables.” '"
In regards to the fourth step of (4) analyzing the data, Fischer explains that “in the
language of research methodology, a hypothesis is tested to determine whether the
program, as an ‘independent variable,’ has an effect on various conditions and factors
which are constituted as ‘dependant’ variables. If a program is effective, the statistical
presentation of experimental data should show a positive correlation between the
program and the experimental group’s responses.”" ’
This final step in experimental research also entails the two concepts of external
validity and internal validity. These concepts are used as criteria for determining the
acceptability of the experimental findings."’ “External validity,’ as Fischer explains,
‘refers to whether the findings of an experiment can be replicated in similar
circumstances and generalized to a larger population.”'

Internal validity, “concerns the

ways in which an experiment is designed and implemented. To maximize the internal
validity of an experiment, the researcher must focus on the explicitness of the definition

" ” Ibid., 29-30.
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of the research question or hypothesis, and the development of a research procedure that
provides for early estimates of both immediate and long-range effects. He or she must
also confront the ever present concern that the study can become contaminated by social
and technical factors extraneous to the experiment itself, the appropriateness of the
people selected to participate, and the tests chosen to measure the experiment.”" ’
It is within this final step of analyzing the data collected from the experiment that one
will find the answers to the first two questions of program verification. Depending on the
outcome of the test result(s), it is assumed that one would be able to determine whether
the program does in fact, justified by empirical evidence, fulfill its predetermined
objective, or in cases where it does not, the empirical analysis may uncover secondary or
unanticipated effects that offset the program’s predetermined objective(s).
(b)

Quasi-Experimental Research

Quasi-experimental research, as Fischer notes, is more often used when evaluating
public programs, for “it is rarely if ever possible for every aspect of an experiment to be
carried out under completely controlled conditions. For example, it may be ethically,
politically, or legally improper to create a control group by denying a service to people.
Or it may be impractical to use pretest measures for a program that is already in
operation.”" ” According to Fischer, there are four different forms of quasi-experimental
designs that are particularly important in quasi-experimental research: (1) ‘true control
group, posttest only design’, which is used “when a pretest is not available or when it
would take too much time (Fitz-Gibbon, Morris, and Lindheim, 1987)”; (2) ‘pretest-
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posttest, non-equivalent control design’, which is used “when the researcher cannot
randomly assign subjects to the control group”; (3) ‘single group times-series design’,
which is used “when a control group cannot be established, but the same measures can be
applied to one group o f people or things several times before and several times after the
program’s implementation”; and (4) ‘pretest-posttest design with no control group’,
which is used “to examine obvious effects, but without the confidence that the program
and not an outside variable has influenced results.”" ’
As Fischer notes, these four types of quasi-experimental design all attempt to make
use of as many elements of experimental evaluation research as possible. Thus, we will
find many of the four elements of; (1) specifying the one or more programmatic
objectives as criteria for analysis; (2) finding and developing quantitative indicators that
appropriately measure the specified objective(s); (3) determining the appropriate target
population and the corresponding sample for the evaluation; and (4) analyzing the data
collected after the experiment has been carried out, within quasi-experimental research."*
Much of the variances among these quasi-experimental research methods and within
experimental research methods are found in how each quasi-experimental method, due to
the various difficulties that may arise, treats the finding or development of quantitative
indicators, and the determination of the target group in its corresponding experimental
method.
In that they reflect the method of experimental evaluation researeh, the methods of
quasi-experimental research are assumed to also be able to determine whether a program
117
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fulfills its predetermined objective, or in cases where it does not, the empirical analysis
may uncover secondary or unanticipated effects that offset the program’s predetermined
objective(s). Although as Fischer notes, “each of these quasi-experimental designs
introduces a degree of uncertainty about the reliability and validity of the experimental
findings.”" ” Thus, the degree to which quasi-experimental methods can determine
whether the program does in fact fulfill its predetermined objective, or may uncover
secondary or unanticipated effects that offset the program’s predetermined objective(s), is
more uncertain than what is assumed of experimental research methods.
The final question in program verification, the question of whether the program
fulfills the objective(s) more efficiently than the alternative means available, is
determined most often by either cost-benefit analysis or risk-benefit analysis (a variant of
cost-benefit analysis). As Fischer states, “once an outcome of a program has been
empirically established, evaluation can further measure it, as a ‘benefit’, against the costs
that were involved in achieving it.”'’” And as Fischer continues, in the method of costbenefit analysis, “the analyst first identifies the monetary costs of the input factors needed
to accomplish a particular program, then assigns monetary values to the estimated or
actual outcomes associated with the programs, and finally calculates the efficiency of the
program as a ratio of costs expended to benefits produced. An efficient program is one in
which the benefits outweigh the costs; an inefficient program is one in which the costs
outweigh the benefits.”' ’'
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In regards to risk-benefit analysis, Fischer notes, “essentially, risk-benefit analysis is
‘a type of cost-benefit analysis in which the negative consequences of a project or
program are measured in terms of the types and magnitudes o f risk to individuals or to
communities instead of in monetary units’ (Sylvia, Meier, Gunn, 1991:60).”’^^ As
Fischer continues, “the methodology of risk-benefit analysis is fundamentally an
integration of two methodologies: risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis.”’^^
In program verification, as we saw within its three focusing questions, and within the
method of experimental evaluation research, quasi-experimental evaluation, cost-benefit
analysis, and risk benefit analysis, the process of verification specifies a discourse that
addresses the use of quantitative measurements in determining whether a policy fulfills
its specified program objectives.'^'' It is important to note here that Fischer makes a
distinction between policy objectives and policy goals. Although they may seem one and
the same, policy objectives are “quantifiable programmatic criteria” derived from broadly
stated abstract policy goals.
Within Fischer’s methodology, this is only the first level of discourse in which policy
analysts take part. For Fischer, although program verification may direct inquiry,
knowledge consists in understanding the meanings and values associated with the object
of inquiry. Thus, the analyst moves from this point of analysis to discovering the
meanings and values associated with these objects or events in the second level of
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discourse - contextual discourse. By doing so, the analyst shifts from quantitative modes
of inquiry to interpretive modes of inquiry.
(3) Level of Contextual Discourse:
Situational Validation
Contextual discourse, for Fischer, constitutes what he refers to as first-order policy
ev alu atio n .F irst-o rd e r policy evaluation is concerned with what Fischer refers to as
first-order constructs, “the social actor’s constructs.”'^^ Thus, the focus of contextual
discourse, which entails the process of situational validation, is in revealing the constructs
of the social actors, and results in a first-order explanation. This is similar to what
Yanow refers to as first-level interpretation of the policy situation experienced by the
various stakeholders or policy-relevant actors. This is essentially oriented towards
gaining knowledge of non-material thoughts and meanings (value claims). Similar to
Yanow’s and Stone’s use of hermeneutic methods, according to Fischer, through case
studies, observation and interviews, the policy analyst is thought to gain an understanding
of (1) how various stakeholders may see the various elements of the program verification
as being relevant or not to the objective at hand, (2) how various stakeholders view the
situation or the problem and make cases for exceptions, and (3) how various stakeholders
understand the objeetives to constitute differing criteria. These three elements eonstitute
understanding the various perspectives of various stakeholders in regards to the
information arrived at from program verification.

Ibid.
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Idem, Reframing Public Policy, 51.
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As Fischer notes regarding the proeess of situational validation, “The validation
phase of policy evaluation is eoncemed with the relevance of poliey objectives employed
in an evaluative judgment. Whereas verification attempts to show that a program fulfills
or fails to fulfill an objective, validation asks whether the policy objectives are
appropriate to the specific problem situation under investigation. To render such an
assessment, evaluation turns from an emphasis on the empirical rigor of quantitative
research to normative discourse and the interpretive methods of qualitative analysis.
Fischer continues to explain that the method of situational validation is centered on
three major questions: (1) “is the program objective(s) relevant to the problem’; (2) ‘are
there circumstances in the situation that require an exception be made to the objective(s)’;
and (3) ‘are two or more objectives equally relevant to the problem situation.
According to Fischer, in answering the first question of situational validation, (1)
whether the program objectives are relevant to the problem under investigation, the
analyst is to produce an argument, according to the rules of informal logic, that argues
that the variables selected and measured during the process of program vindication were
determined according to the objective, and that the objective meets the requirements of
certain higher goals which have been obtained from expanding the terms of the objectives
to greater abstraction. As Fischer explains it, “The relevance of a program can be
established through both an appeal to the facts of the situation and the more general (or
higher) goal from which the objective at issue has been reduced. The appeal to a higher
goal is essentially an exercise in logic. It entails a logical demonstration that the

Idem, Evaluating Public Policy, 69.
Ibid., 70.
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objective under investigation actually meets the requirements of the higher criterion.
According to the principles of normative logic, it is said that the objective falls within the
range or scope of the higher goal. ..With regard to the facts of the situation, the focus is
on empirical context from whieh the program variables are selected and measured.”
The second question of situational validation, (2) determining whether there are
circumstances in the situation that require an exception be made to the objective(s),
according to Fischer, “must be based on evidence showing that it is better to permit an
exception to the objective than to fulfill it. A circumstantial exception requires showing
that the objective under judgment is applied to a situation in which it leads to secondary
or unexpected consequences that offset—qualify, compromise, or perhaps even negate—
the beneficial outcomes. Such consequences can result from either conflict between
competing criteria, specific dimensions of the situation, or both. Basic, then, to such a
deduction is the empirical description and definition of the particular facts of the
situation.”'^'
Not only does identifying exeeptions entail the understanding of the empirical
description and definition of the particular facts of the s itu a tio n ,b u t this question also

Ibid., 73.
131

Ibid., 74.

By ‘empirical description’ or ‘definition’, Fischer understands this to indicate what
descriptions or definitions were used as empirieally testable variables of the situation or
event. Thus, Fischer’s notion of empirical definition reflects the integration of both
quantitative and qualitative methods. It considers these definitions to be supported by
empirical evidence, but it also admits to the notion that descriptions and definitions are
socially constructed, thus there is a possibility of having competing descriptions or
definitions that are used as variables for empirical verification. The key to understanding
this conception of empirical description or definition is that, according to Fischer, if there
are competing descriptions or definitions, then these are not forms of knowledge,
94
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“involves determining what constitutes a good reason for inferring conclusions entitled
by particular circumstances. In particular terms, this involves assembling both the
arguments for and against specific programmatic objectives and the empirical facts of the
situation, and subjecting them logical rules or reason. The most basie objective is to
decide whether or not there is anything about the factual circumstances themselves which
requires that an exception be made to the applieation or use of the eriterion [determined
by the objective].”'^^
The final question of situational validation, (3) determining whether there are two or
more objectives equally relevant to the problem situation, occurs “when an aspect of one
[objective] that is judged to be bad is considered to be good by another [objective].”'^'*
This occurs within the process of situational validation primarily when various
stakeholders view the problem or the objective differently. In this case, according to
Fischer, “to resolve such conflict, it is necessary to determine which of the objectives
takes precedence, a process involving a logical appeal to higher-order criteria. Whether
one or another objective is better is established by ranking them aceording to a higher
standard or goal. When one objective is determined to take precedence over the others, it
can be said that the first one is a ‘higher’ claim or establishes a ‘higher obligation.

although they are empirically verifiable. For these descriptions or definitions to be forms
of knowledge, there must be a universal consensus as to their description or definition.
133

Ibid., 74.
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As Fischer notes, there may be no higher level goal or principle that would help in
resolving the conflict of competing objectives, thus one would be move from the firstorder evaluation of situational validation to the second-order evaluation of societal
vindication, which occurs within Fischer’s third level of discourse— systemie
d isco u rse.S eco n d -o rd er evaluation is concerned with the constructs of social science
and results in the social scientists’ second-order explanation.'^^ This too is oriented
towards arriving at knowledge of non-material thoughts and meanings (value claims).
(4) Level of Systemic Discourse:
Societal Vindication
As Fischer goes on to explain, “at the level of policy vindication, the societal system
is the normative frame of reference. A societal system, in this respect, can be broadly
understood as an interdependent set of political, economic, and cultural relationships.
The concept of the ‘system’ is used here to refer to a set of arrangements principally
structured by the state and the economy and governed by power and money (Habermas,
1973).”'^^ Given the normative reference of the societal system, the first task of
vindication involves the:
Identification of goals, values, and practices of the institutional arrangements of
the social system which the policy is designed to influence, facilitate, or change.
Second, it involves an empirical assessment of the policy’s desired impact on
these normative processes. The comparison in the evaluation involves the
adoption and testing of other actual or possible policy goals and assumptions that
may or may not have instrumental or contributive value for the same social
system. The basic task is to develop hypotheses about the wider societal impacts

Ibid., 75.
Idem, Reframing Public Policy, 51.
Ibid., 112-13.
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that would be expected to result from the policy goals and assumptions, and to
test them to see if they occur.
Identifying the goals, values, and praetiees of the societal system and testing the
policy goals, and alternative policy goals, to determine whether the policy, or alternative
policy, has an instrumental or contributive value, or is harmful to the societal system, is
done by using a range of various research methods. The choice of which of these
methods is used is determined by the policy problem, and the methods that can be
employed ranges from quantitative methods of empirical data collection methodologies,
large-scale cross-sectional analyses, cost-benefit data, systems simulation to qualitative
methods of interviews and case studies.'''*’
These research methods are used not only in determining the effects of the policy, or
policy alternatives, but they are also employed to gain understanding of the normative
framework of the society, the goals and values of the society. In determining the
normative framework of a society, these methods assist specifically in identifying the
underlying assumptions of the normative framework of society. Some of these
assumptions are characterized as assumptions regarding;
• The proper scope of market versus governmental activity.
• The proper distribution of power and authority among various levels of
government; the identification of social and political groups whose welfare is
considered to be most important.
•
The positions of substantive policy conflicts, such as economic development
versus environmental protection.
• The basic choices concerning policy means, such as inducements, persuasion,
and coercion.
• The desirability of political participation by various segments of the social
system: elite versus public participation; experts versus elected officials.
Ibid., 116.
140

Ibid., 117.
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• The perceived ability of soeiety to solve the various substantive problems, for
example, technologieal optimism versus pessimism.''"
Although these methods may contribute to the final process of determining whether
policy programs, or policy alternatives, have any instrumental or contributive value to the
societal system, the determination of whether or not they do is done by the methods of
determining macro costs and benefits. As with the first two levels of discourse, the
analyst in the end presents his finding as an argument according to the rules of informal
logic. In this case, the analyst argues in support of a specific program, or program
alternative, as one that has the most instrumental or contributive value to the societal
system. If this claim is further contested on the basis of conflicting conceptions of
determining macro costs and benefits, the evaluation, according to Fischer, moves form
the third level of systems discourse to the fourth level of discourse, ideological discourse.
(5) Level of Ideological Discourse:
Social Choice
According to Fischer, “the fourth and final discursive phase of the logic of policy
deliberation turns to ideological and value questions. Here the informal logic of criteria
of consistency and transcendent values come into play. Social choice seeks to establish
and examine the selection of a critical basis for making rationally informed choices about
societal systems and their respective ways of l i f e . T h i s process is referred to by
Fischer as soeial choice, and is also oriented towards arriving at non-material thoughts

Ibid., 113.
Ibid, 195.
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and meanings (value claims). As Fischer eontinues to explain, social choice raises the
following types of questions:
• Do the fundamental ideals (or ideological principles) that organize the accepted
social order provide a consistent basis for a legitimate resolution of conflicting
judgments?
• If the social order is unable to resolve the basic values eonflicts, do other orders
equitably accommodate the relevant interests and needs that the conflicts
reflect?
• Do normative reflection and empirical evidence support the justification and
adoption of alternative principles and values?*''^
These questions, as noted by Fischer, are questions most often dealt with by political
philosophers rather than the policy analysts.''*'' What the policy analyst, according to
Fischer, needs to consider in this final discursive level is that the analytic judgments
made throughout their evaluations, and the evaluations themselves, are framed within a
specific ideological framework, a framework of “fundamental ideals (or ideological
principles)” that organize a specific social order.'''^
In explicating this framework, Fischer hopes that the analyst not only understands the
possibility of bias located within their judgments and within their evaluations, but he also
hopes that the analyst may come to understand the ideological roots of various conflicting
interpretations of a poliey situation.'''^ In understanding the various ideological roots of
different interpretations of the policy situation, it is also hoped that the analyst may
eventually be able to establish a consensual understanding, or interpretation, of the policy

Ibid.
'""Ibid., 161.
'"^ Ibid., 195.
146

Idem, Evaluating Public Policy, 113.
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situation by establishing a eonsensus of certain fundamental normative principles of
. ^

society.

M7

It is important to note here that the characterization of Fischer’s discursive theory as a
representative of critieal theory is rooted in the importance of his final discursive phase of
ideological discourse. Because this level of discourse ehallenges the analyst to reveal the
ideological framework behind the various perspectives within the fourth level of
discourse—revealing with it specific presuppositions regarding society, citizens, and
power—this level of discourse challenges the analyst to conduct a critical analysis of the
interpretations of a policy issue and the various ideologies underlining that policy issue.
c) Defining Purpose of Policy Analysis
Finally, the last methodological tenet of Fischer’s discursive theory of policy analysis
is the tenet regarding the definition of policy analysis. According to Fischer, policy
evaluation is defined as:
The activity of applied social science typically referred to as ‘poliey analysis’ or
‘policy science.’ (Box 1.1) The field according to William Dunn (1981), is an
applied endeavor ‘which uses multiple methods of inquiry and argument to
produce and transform poliey-relevant information that may be utilized in
political settings to resolve public problems.’ Designed to supply information
about complex social and economic problems and to assess the processes through
which their resolution is pursued, evaluations can focus on policy or program
outcomes (‘outcome’ or ‘impact’ evaluations), or on the proeesses by which a
policy or program is formulated and implemented (‘process’ evaluation)...Ideally,
policy evaluation provides politicians and citizens with intelligent basis for
discussing and judging conflicting ideas, proposals and outcomes.’"*
Yet Fischer’s theory is not only aimed at providing a framework for discourse, but he
also holds that through his four levels of discourse, consensus may be established and

Idem, Reframing Public Policy, 198.
’"* Idem, Evaluating Public Policy, 2.
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solutions may be agreed upon. He holds that policy analysis needs to employ both
interpretive and empirical modes of inquiry not only to arrive at an understanding of the
policy and its many interpretations, but it also attempts to provide a framework for the
discursive process in which stake-holders can talk about the issues at hand and
eventually, hopefully, establish a consensus regarding the goals, problems and solutions.
Thus, Fischer’s theory, unlike Yanow’s and Stone’s, is aimed not only at understanding,
but also at arriving at a specific solution; a specific choice for the decision-maker(s). In
this sense, Fischer’s theory, like positivist theories of policy analysis, likens policy
analysis to a puzzle, which entails the possibility of a solution, although this solution may
never be reached.

Summary
In this chapter, we have been introdueed to three theories representing the three
perspectives of the hermeneutic critique. All three theories are similar in their
ontological, epistemological, and methodological tenets, although there are some points
of departure. The similarities are primarily located within their ontological and
epistemological tenets opposing the fact-value dichotomy, their tenet of quasi-causal
explanations, their denial of the positivists’ doetrine of the unity of science, their tenet of
the situated knower who can affect the outeome of analysis, and their tenet of
hermeneutic methods o f inquiry. These tenets can be identified as the general
postpositivist paradigm that all three theories use, and can be used to distinguish them
from positivist theories of policy analysis.
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In addition, like positivist theories of policy analysis, through these paradigmatic
tenets, the three theories aequire limitations to the kinds of problems that are to be
considered, and the character of the solutions and the methods of inquiry. Yet, compared
to the positivist paradigm of policy analysis, these paradigmatie tenets broaden the scope
of the problems, solutions, and methods for policy analysis. As mentioned in Chapter II,
one of the major criticisms of positivist paradigm for policy analysis was that the
limitations it placed on these aspects of policy analysis were too narrow, especially
because their ontological and epistemological tenets of the faet-value dichotomy limit
their inquiry to physical objects, or things that are reducible to physical objects. Thus,
they obviate inquiry into value claims. The three theories representing the three
perspectives o f the hermeneutic critique offer paradigmatic tenets that broaden the scope
of these aspects of policy analysis when compared to the positivist paradigm. Their
denial of the positivist’s ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value
dichotomy lead them to conclude that value claims are not only appropriate for inquiry,
but that inquiry into value claims is central to policy analysis.
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CHAPTER IV

EVALUATING THEORIES OF
THE HERMENEUTIC CRITIQUE
As noted in the previous chapters, theorists and practitioners have proposed
alternative theories to overcome some of the significant problems associated with
positivist theories. These alternative theories have been identified in general as
postpositivist theories or postempiricist theories. Within this general category of
alternative theories to the general positivist paradigm, Morçôl has identified theories of
the hermeneutic critique as the most coherent theory stream among postpositivist
theories. As Morçôl continued to explain, there are three theoretieal perspeetives within
the hermeneutic critique; the interpretive/phenomenological perspective, the discourse
perspective, and the critical perspective.
In Chapter III, I presented a general summary of three theories representing each of
the three perspectives within the hermeneutic critique. Many of the similarities between
each of the theories lie in their ontological and epistemological tenets, especially the
denial of the ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value dichotomy. They
also share the methodological tenet regarding the importance of using hermeneutic
techniques in policy inquiry, and the denial of the positivist tenet of the unity of science.
The question remains, given these three examples of the three perspectives within the
hermeneutic critique, how well do they succeed in overcoming the criticisms that face
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positivist theories of policy analysis? Thus, this chapter is centered on the question of
whether the three theories representing the three perspectives of the hermeneutic critique
are able to overcome the challenges presented by the criticisms of positivist theories of
policy analysis. It focuses on four specific challenges; (1) the challenge of overcoming
the ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value dichotomy, (2) the challenge
of providing a democratic process of decision-making within their method of poliey
analysis, (3) the challenge of providing a coherent theory of policy analysis, and (4) the
challenge of resolving the problem of policy analysis as ideology.
In the broad sense regarding the revolution of the science of policy analysis, this
question is aimed at determining whether the alternative paradigm used by the three
theories representing the three perspectives of the hermeneutic critique is more successful
than the positivist paradigm in resolving some of the key issues identified by theorists
and practitioners. As Kuhn noted, “Paradigms gain their status because they are more
successful than their competitors in solving a few problems that the group of practitioners
has come to recognize as acute.”' Thus, the question this chapter addresses is also aimed
at determining whether the alternative general paradigm used by the three theories
presented is worthy of the status that it is currently gaining.

' Kuhn, 23.
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The Challenge of the Ontologieal and
Epistemological Tenets of
the Fact-Value Dichotomy
As stated in Chapter II, the positivist paradigm of poliey analysis holds the
ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value dichotomy. These tenets
conclude that there exist two categories of things: physical objects that yield knowledge
as facts, and value elaims that are meaningless and thus, cannot yield any knowledge.
They led positivist theories of policy analysis to limit their scope of inquiry to physical
objects and facts. One reason is that the epistemological tenet of the fact-value
dichotomy is rooted in the verification criterion of meaning, and according to the
verification criterion of meaning, those things that are knovvable, and thus have meaning
or literal significance, are those things that are empirically verifiable through sense
experience. As A.J Ayer explains, aecording to the verification criterion of meaning, “no
statement whieh refers to ‘reality’ transcending the limits of all possible sense experience
can possibly have any literal significance.”^ Thus, the epistemological tenet of the factvalue dichotomy holds that “All knowledge was believed to depend on observation [via
the five senses], thus any claims, whether theologieal, metaphysical, philosophical,
ethical, normative, or aesthetic, which were not rooted in empirical observation, were
rejected as meaningless.”^ Therefore, derived from the ontological and epistemological
tenets of the fact-value dichotomy, positivist theories of policy analysis attempt to
circumscribe the activity of policy analysis to those things that are empirically

^ A.J. Ayer, The Elimination o f Metaphysics, ed. J. Baillie, Contemporary Analytic
Philosophy (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentiee Flail Ine., 1997), 107.
^ Hawkesworth, 38.
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verifiable— supported by data from physical objects or things that are reducible to
physical objects—while taking value claims that entail various interpretations, meanings,
and values, and are not supported by empirical evidence as given.
It has been argued that the ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value
dichotomy reflect the positivist’s misconception of the nature of the objects of inquiry for
policy analysis. As Fay, Yanow, Stone, and Fischer argue, following from their denial of
the ontological tenet of the faet value-dichotomy, not only can value claims yield
knowledge, but the use of this knowledge is what is most important to policy analysis.
They note that the objects of inquiry for policy analysis are also value claims, which are
necessarily value-laden; they entail interpretations, meanings, and values. The
epistemological tenet of the fact-value dichotomy, rooted in the ontological and
epistemological tenets of the fact-value dichotomy, ignore this inherent value-laden
element of the objects inquiry for policy analysis; they should not be understood as given.
For the three theories representing the three perspectives of the hermeneutic critique,
the challenge is then to be able to overcome both the ontological and epistemological
tenets of the fact-value dichotomy; to provide a theory of policy analysis that considers
value claims significant to policy inquiry—a theory that takes note of the value-laden
nature of the objects of policy analysis— and to provide a method of gaining knowledge
of the value-laden aspects of the objects of inquiry for policy analysis.
In response to this challenge, Yanow, Stone, and Fiseher propose ontologieal and
epistemologieal shifts—the denial of both the ontological and epistemological tenets of
the fact-value dichotomy. This also leads to a methodological shift that incorporates and
focuses on the use of qualitative methods of policy analysis and the discovery of quasi-
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causal modes of explanation. As a result, Yanow proposes a theory of policy analysis
that stresses the importance of the kind of knowledge derived from value claims,
although she does not deny that knowledge ean also be gained from physical objects
alone, which results in knowledge as facts. For Fischer and Stone, the result is that only
value claims can produce knowledge. This is because both Fischer and Stone argue that
facts themselves are always value-laden. Thus, in order to know facts, one must also
uncover the underlying meanings, interpretations, and values that are associated with
facts. Thus, Fischer and Stone juxtapose the categories of objects that are knowable and
not knowable which are presupposed by the positivist’s ontological and epistemological
tenets of the fact-value dichotomy. Instead of presupposing that only facts, which are
supported by empirical evidence obtained from physical objects or those things reducible
to physical objects, are knowledge, they assume that only by explicating the value claims
can one arrive at knowledge. Thus, only value claims (some embedded in physical
claims) can produce knowledge.
The denial of both the ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value
dichotomy also lead the three theories to assume that assume that knowledge is a
construct, and this leads them to conclude that it is never complete and is temporal.
Although Fischer believes in the incompleteness and temporality of knowledge, he also
assumes that knowledge is characterized by consensus, unlike Yanow and Stone. Thus,
Fischer concludes that in most cases, when consensus is not established, we are always in
the process of constructing knowledge— of establishing a consensus. Yanow simply
concludes that knowledge is provisional, and Stone concludes that knowledge is
subjective in regard to the truth of the statements.
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Methodologically, the denial of the ontological and epistemological tenets of the factvalue dichotomy lead all three theories to deny the positivist’s tenet of the unity of
science. Yanow argues that because value claims can yield knowledge, but of a differing
kind, the methods used to gain knowledge of physical objects and facts are not applicable
to gaining knowledge from value claims. Fischer and Stone, on the other hand, argue that
although both quantitative and qualitative methods are useful, knowledge is actually
derived from qualitative methods, since they argue that facts must undergo qualitative
analysis in order to produce knowledge. Thus, all three theories offer methods for
gaining knowledge of value claims that are focused around discovering various
interpretations, meanings, and values. However, for Fischer and Stone, these are the only
methods that produce knowledge. Most often, these methods are referred to as
hermeneutic methods, and the result is a quasi-causal understanding of social or natural
phenomena.
Methodologically, all three theories also foeus on the importance of quasi-causal
modes of explanation. Yanow argues that discovering the quasi-causal explanations held
by various communities of meaning is the main objective for policy analysis. To map out
the various discourses within a specific policy situation is to provide the quasi-causal
explanations held by differing communities of meaning. For Stone, quasi-causal
explanations are objects of deconstruction. A major step in policy analysis for Stone is
the task of deconstructing the various quasi-causal explanations embedded within the
competing policy perspectives. For Fischer, quasi-causal explanations play significant
roles within his second and fourth levels of discourse—contextual discourse and
ideologieal diseourse respectively. In contextual discourse, the objective is to provide a
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micro quasi-causal explanation of the knowledge gained from technical-analytic
discourse, whereas in ideological discourse, the objective is to provide a macro quasicausal explanation of the conclusions drawn from systemic discourse.
At first glance, these solutions to the challenge of the ontological and epistemological
tenets of the fact-value dichotomy seem obvious. If the ontological and epistemological
tenets of the fact-value dichotomy, which lead to the positivist tenet of the unity of
science and the focus on deductive-npmological explanations or explanations of
probabilistic law, are problematic, then why remain committed to them? If the criticism
is that positivist theories fail to give due weight to the methodological importance of
meanings, interpretations, and values, due to their ontological and epistemological tenets
of the fact-value dichotomy, which leads them to their methodological tenets, then it
makes sense to offer as a solution alternative theories founded upon a paradigm that
denies the ontological and epistemological tenet of the fact-value dichotomy, denies the
positivist tenet of the unity of scienee, and uses alternative methods of inquiry and modes
of explanation. By doing so, the three theories successfully bring to the forefront those
issues that positivist theories have been criticized as obviating. The explications of value
claims become important aspects of each of the three theories. This effectively broadens
the scope of inquiry for policy analysis and allows not only for inquiry into value elaims,
but also focuses policy analysis towards such inquiry.
Yet, questions remain regarding the further implications of the ontological,
epistemological, and methodological shifts made by the three theories representing the
three perspectives of the hermeneutic critique. The criticism that positivist theories of
policy analysis fail to recognize value claims as knowable and thus, important to analysis.
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is not only about their inability to recognize this claim as legitimate, but it also points to
the importance of the knowledge gained from value claims to the process of policy
analysis, especially within the process of decision-making. Thus, given that the three
theories representing the three perspective of the hermeneutic critique are able to meet
the challenge of providing a theory that stresses the importance that value claims are able
to yield knowledge of a certain kind, and provides for an alternative method of inquiry
and mode of explanation that are tailored to the kind of knowledge gained from value
claims, how is it that they apply this knowledge to the decision-making process of policy
analysis? How is it that they realize the importance of the kind of knowledge gained
from value claims?

The Challenge of Providing a Democratic
Process of Decision-Making
Positivist theories of policy analysis have also been criticized for denying a
democratic process of decision-making. This is because positivist theories of policy
analysis understand value claims as given, and so fail to take into consideration the
various interpretations, meanings, and values that may come into play during the analysis
of policy. Therefore, the conclusion that a specific policy alternative is the ‘best’ is
undemocratic because it does not allow for alternative interpretations, meanings, and
values that may be held by relevant communities of meaning or stakeholders. This also
leads to the conclusion that the decisions arrived at by the positivist policy analyst is ill
informed, sinee these alternative interpretations, meaning, and values are not taken into
consideration. Thus, the ontological and epistemological denials of the fact-value
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dichotomy are intimately related to the importance of incorporating a democratic process
of decision-making. The incorporation of a democratic process of decision-making
provides the instrumental use of knowledge gained from value claims; the knowledge that
the epistemological denial of the faet-value dichotomy stresses as being most important
in the analysis of policy.
This criticism is further associated with notions of democracy, equal participation,
and the legitimacy of the decision made by policy analysts and decision-maker(s). As
Fischer notes, “Citizen participation is the cornerstone of the democratic political
process. The case for democracy derives its basie normative rationale from the prineiple
that government decisions should reflect the consent of the governed. Citizens in a
democracy have a right— even obligation—to participate meaningfully in public
decision-making and to be informed about the bases for government policies.”" The
positivist’s teehnocratic conception of policy analysis denies citizens their democratic
right to participate in the decision-making process. In doing so, it leads the public to
question whether the decisions reflect the consent of the governed.^ In addition,
according to Fischer, a democratic process of decision-making helps preserve democraey.
As Fischer notes, “Beyond its essential contribution to democracy per se, citizen
participation in the policy process can contribute to the legitimization of policy
development and implementation. Participation, in this respect, can be understood as
helping to build and preserve present and future decision-making capacities....

Fischer, Reframing Public Policy, 205.
^ This criticism is o f course based on the assumption that democracy is good or
necessary for a society.
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Discursive participation offers, in particular, the possibility of getting around the
debilitating effects of interest group competition that often plague liberal pluralism
(Hiskes 1998).”^ Thus, the positivist’s technocratic conception of policy analysis is also
viewed as being detrimental to a democracy—it illegitimates the decision, the proeess of
policy development, and the process of implementation as democratic/
Thus, another challenge for the three theories representing the three perspectives of
the hermeneutic critique, and postpositivist theories in general, is whether they are able to
provide a theory that incorporates a democratic process of decision-making; a theory that
appropriately makes use of the knowledge derived from value claims. The three
criticisms noted above also provide criteria for determining whether a theory is able to
successfully overcome the challenge of incorporating a democratic process of decision
making. These criteria ask whether the instrumental use of knowledge gained from value
elaims: (1) adequately provide for a well-informed decision; (2) reflect the consent of the
governed, in other words, does it accommodate the right of the citizen to partieipate in
the decision-making process; and (3) help to legitimize the process of policy development
and implementation as democratic?
Although the three theories, each to differing extents, attempt to provide for a more
democratic process of decision-making, in that they take into consideration the various
value claims that entail various interpretations, meanings, and values that may be
associated by various communities of meaning or stakeholders, only Fischer’s discourse

*’ Ibid.
^ The force of this criticism is also based on the assumption that democracy is good or
necessary for a society.
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theory is able to fully overcome the challenge of providing a democratic process for
decision-making by fulfilling all three criteria listed above.
Fischer’s theory addresses the importance of inquiry into value claims specifically
within the last three levels of discourse assumed by his theory. Aecording to Fischer’s
theory, within the second level of contextual diseourse, through the process of situational
validation, various interpretations, meanings, and values are taken into consideration in
order to determine whether the assessment that policy objectives have been met is
consistent with the various interpretations, meanings, and values held by various
communities of meaning or stakeholders. Within this process of situational validation,
there may be an issue of irreconcilable competing objectives or values. In this ease,
according to Fischer “there is no possibility of resolving the dispute at the level of
validation. If the parties are committed to pursue the discourse further, they must move
to the level of vindication.”* It is at this point, where the shift from second level of
contextual discourse to the third level of systemic discourse, or from the process of
situational validation to the process of societal vindication, occurs.
According to Fischer, societal vindication “turns to an evaluation of the instrumental
consequenees of a policy goal and its normative tenets for the extant social system as a
whole. In the language o f polities and policy evaluation, goals and assumptions are
examined for their contribution to the larger common good, public interest, or general
social welfare of the society, shorthand normative standards for the social order as a
w h o l e . T h u s , within the third level of systemic discourse, the competing objectives or

Idem, Evaluating Public Policy, 75.
^ Ibid., 111-112.
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values that were identified during situational validation are tested against systemsoriented beliefs and assumptions.
One problem with societal vindication is that the goals and values of competing
communities of meaning or stakeholders are evaluated against the normative institutional
goals and values of the societal system, which are generally held as constant. Because of
this, the competing objective or goal that questions the legitimacy of the constantly held
societal norms and assumptions may tend to lose out. Yet, within Fischer’s methods for
policy analysis, analysis can be taken further into the fourth level of ideological
discourse, in which those objectives or goals that question the current societal norms, and
may tend to lose out, can question the ideological foundations of the current societal
norms. Thus, challenges to the societal norms, which are generally held as constant, are
addressed within the fourth level of ideological discourse through the process of social
choice.
Fischer’s fourth level of ideological discourse, the process of social choice, deals with
the questions of (1) whether the fundamental ideals (or ideological principles) that
organize the accepted social order provide a consistent basis for a legitimate resolution
for conflicting judgments, (2) whether when the social order is unable to resolve the basic
value eonflicts, other orders equitably accommodate the relevant interests and needs that
the conflicts reflect, and (3) whether the normative reflection and empirical evidence
support the justification and adoption of alternative principles and values.'*’ According to
Fischer, political philosophers rather than policy analysts and the various community
members or stakeholders are to address these questions. Yet, during this process of

'*’ Idem, Reframing Public Policy, 195.
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ideological discourse, communities of meaning or stakeholders ean talk about the various
ideologies provided by political philosophers. They openly diseuss which ideological
perspective they endorse and the points of conflict between competing ideologieal
perspectives. Thus, although Fischer’s theory does assume that some person(s) sits in the
position of a decision-maker(s), all the relevant stakeholders or communities of meaning
share the actual process of decision-making. The result is that, the deeision that decisionmaker(s) is to make, is the decision that has been consensually decided upon among the
various stakeholders or communities of meaning. It is specifically because of this that
Fischer’s theory is able to meet the second and third criteria. In addition, by recognizing,
within all three levels o f discourse, the possibility of alternative interpretations,
meanings, and values, Fischer’s theory is able to fulfill the first criterion.
Unlike Fischer’s theory, Yanow’s theory falls short of incorporating a democratic
process of decision-making. The main goal of policy analysis, for Yanow’s theory, is to
map out the architecture of policy discourse for the decision-maker(s). This entails
inquiry into the various value claims held by the various communities of meaning
relevant to the policy issue at hand. By doing so, Yanow’s theory allows each voice or
policy perspective to be equally heard by the decision-maker(s). Thus, Yanow’s theory
uses the various value claims that may be associated with various communities of
meaning in order to provide for a more informed decision.
Yet, Yanow’s theory fails to fulfill the other two criteria for determining whether a
theory successfully incorporates a democratic process of decision-making. It may be true
that according to Yanow’s theory, the decision-maker(s) is made aware of the various
perspectives within a policy discourse, but the decision itself is ultimately left up to the
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decision-maker(s). Because of this, the decision-maker(s) may or may not deny the
legitimacy of some of the perspeetives within the policy discourse. Thus, Yanow’s
theory may not actually provide these various communities of meaning an actual role in
the decision-making process and the decision may not reflect the consent of the governed.
In addition, because the decision-maker(s) may deny the legitimacy of certain
perspectives that have been presented, Yanow’s theory also fails to guarantee the
fulfillment of the criterion of helping to legitimize the process of policy development and
implementation as democratic. Thus, Yanow’s theory of interpretive policy analysis fails
to fully overcome the challenge of incorporating a democratic process of decision
making by failing to fulfill two of the three determining criteria. Her theory is open to
democraey, but does not require it.
Yanow’s contingent fourth step of intervention also fails to ensure that the decision
reflects the consent of the governed and that the process of policy development and
implementation is democratic. According to Yanow, if the analyst wishes to pursue with
intervention, the analyst may (1) “show implications of different meanings/interpretations
for policy formulations and/or action,’ (2) ‘show that differences [or conflicts in
meaning] reflect different ways of seeing [epistemological and ethical differences],’ or
(3) ‘negotiate/mediate/intervene in some other form to bridge differences (e.g., suggest
reformulation or reframing [of policy].”*' The analyst may choose to do one or all three
of these steps of intervention, yet because the decision-maker(s) can still deny the
legitimacy of certain implications of different meanings, interpretations, or values, of

” Yanow, Table 1.1, 22.
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different ways of seeing, or the analyst’s attempt to reformulate or reframe the policy,
Yanow’s possible steps of intervention are insufficient for fulfilling the last two criteria.
Stone’s theory also falls short of incorporating a democratic process of decision
making. According to Stone’s theory, policy analysis is partially deconstructive and
partially constructive. Her theory holds that policy analysts should first deconstruct the
various interpretations, meanings, and values that may be associated with alternative
policy perspectives, and then construct a policy alternative that the analyst believes to be
the ‘best.’ The ultimate outcome of this process is policy analysis as a strategically
crafted argument that gives voice to a specific way of understanding and interpreting the
policy situation. Thus, policy analysts are understood to be political advocates.
Although Stone’s method takes into consideration the various alternative policy
perspectives that may hold various value claims, her method does so only as a step
toward making one’s own position or voice stronger. As Stone notes during her example
of her method in action in regards to affirmative action, “I use the tools of Policy
Paradox to help me think about affirmative action, understand the politics of the issue,
analyze and critique the arguments of the other side, and argue persuasively for what I
believe.”'^ Thus, for Stone’s theory, although differing perspectives (which entail
various value claims) do come into play within the process of decision-making, they do
not have an equal voice, since those alternative perspectives are used only to be criticized
in order to make the analyst’s own position stronger. Stone’s use of the knowledge
gained from inquiry into value claims is not necessarily to provide an adequately
informed decision, especially because she suggests that the analyst “state goals

Stone, 385.
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ambiguously and possibly keep some goals secret or hidden’; ‘Keep undesirable
alternatives off the agenda by not mentioning them’; ‘Make your preferred alternative
appear to be the only feasible or possible one’; ‘Focus on one part of the causal chain and
ignore others that would require politically difficult or costly policy actions’; ‘Select from
the infinite range of consequences only those whose cost and benefits will make your
preferred course of action look “best”’; and ‘Choose the course of action that hurts
powerful constituents the least, but portray your decision as creating maximal social good
for a broad public.”'^ Thus, Stone’s theory fails to fulfill the criterion of providing a
democratic process of decision-making that allows for an adequately well-informed
decision to be made.
As an adversarial theory. Stone may argue that by representing a single voice within
the policy discourse, the process of decision-making may be able to fulfill the first
criterion, since alternative voices or interpretations, meanings, and values may be
represented by competing policy analyses. This argument relies on the assumption that
the process of discourse is free, informed, and democratic.
Some liken this to pluralist assumptions that in a democratic society the process of
decision-making is necessarily democratic. But, according to Schneider and Ingram,
critics of pluralist theories “contend that pluralist theory and research have provided an
idealized view of policy making that no longer or has never been realized in the United
States, ”*'* and in a society that is defined by dominant and suppressed members, it is not
true that power and information is fairly distributed, so consent is not necessarily free and

Ibid.
14

Helen Ingram and Anne Larason Schneider, 18.
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informed. As Schneider and Ingram further note, such authors as Ted Lowi offered the
kind of intense criticisms of past pluralist theories of policy analysis. They explain how,
“During three decades of writing Lowi has argued that the competition among interest
groups that pluralist theory holds as a necessary feature of democracy does not exist in
the United States. Lowi (1964) contended that the pluralist vision of democracy as a
competition among a large number of relatively equal groups has been replaced with
‘interest group liberalism’ in which powerful groups capture the policy-making and
implementation process. Interest group liberalism cannot achieve rational policy results
(because it is unable to say ‘no’ to anyone) nor can it address issues of justice (because
the state is mainly the tool of powerful interests).”*^
In addition, as Schneider and Ingram note, “During the formulation phase [of a
policy], ‘iron triangles’ of interest groups, policy analysts, and legislative staff often
control the options that will be considered (Lowi 1979). Again, the interest of the less
powerful may lose out in this process, as the shaping of policy content usually reflects the
way others have framed the problems. Legislation may be packaged in sueh a way
during the deliberations within the legislative body that preferences of persons who are
less attentive lose to those that have full-time lobbyists.”*^ Thus, by inaccurately
assuming the political forum and the process in which policies are decided upon are
ideally democratic, Stone’s theory also fails to meet the criterion of accommodating the
right of the citizen to participate in the decision-making process, thereby being unable to
ensure that the decision reflects the consent of the governed, and also fails to fulfill the

Ibid., 22.
Ibid., 18-19.
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third criterion of contributing to the legitimization of the process of policy development
and implementation as democratic.
Thus, Fischer’s theory adequately overcomes the challenge providing a democratic
process o f decision-making. Yanow’s theory marginally overcomes this challenge, and it
is doubtful that Stone’s theory overcomes this challenge.

The Challenge of Providing a Coherent Theory
of Policy Analysis
Another criticism of positivist theories of policy analysis is that they are incoherent
theories in that they attempt to provide a value-neutral analysis of inherently value-laden
objects of inquiry or by completely obviating the value-laden objects of inquiry. This
criticism is ultimately about the theory’s consistency with the nature of policy analysis.
As Kuhn notes, “Normal science does and must continually strive to bring theory and fact
into closer agreement.”*’ Here then, we can understand this criticism as a criticism
regarding the external coherence of positivist theories; of whether the theories are in
closer agreement with the nature of policy analysis.
According to the positivist’s definition of policy analysis, the ultimate objective of
policy analysis is in “choosing the best policy alternative according to an explicit
decision rule.”** This conception of policy analysis entails a specific choice for the
policy maker; that choice being one that has been determined by the technocratic policy
scientist as the ‘best’ policy alternative in light of other alternatives; without any

*’ Kuhn, 80.
** Jenkins-Smith, 11.
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consideration to the possibilities of various value claims that entail various
interpretations, meanings, and values. Given the claim that the objects of policy analysis
are inherently value-laden, the positivist policy analysts are unable to resolve this conflict
between their coneeption of policy analysis and the value-ladenness of the objects of
inquiry for policy analysis. This is due their ontological, epistemological, and
methodological tenets that are in inherent contradiction with the conception that the
objects of policy analysis are value-laden.
For postpositivist theories of policy analysis, the question of coherence is more so
about internal coherence; the question is whether their methods are consistent with their
ontological and epistemological tenets—tenets that reflect the value-laden nature of the
objects of policy analysis. In this sense, the ontological and epistemological tenets held
by the three theories representing the three perspectives of the hermeneutic critique are
intimately linked to their ability to incorporate a democratic process of decision-making
that allows a well-informed decision to be made. This is because one must ask, what is
the purpose of stressing the importance of the value-laden nature of policy analysis? As
noted, one of the major reasons for acknowledging that value claims (interpretations,
meanings, and values) can yield knowledge and stressing the importance of this
knowledge in policy analysis, is due to the recognition that the knowledge gained from
inquiry into value claims contribute to the process of making an adequately wellinformed decision.
Although it is also important to incorporate a democratic process of decision-making
in order to ensure that the decision made by the decision-maker(s) reflects the consent of
the governed, and helps to legitimize the process of policy development and
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implementation as democratic, these criteria does not necessarily apply when determining
the coherence of the theories presented. Denying the instrumental use of value claims for
these purposes do not necessarily undermine the importance of value elaims within the
process of analysis, it instead adds to the importance of value claims in the process of
analysis for those societies that consider democracy necessary or good. Yet, denying the
importance o f value claims for the purpose of providing an adequately well informed
decision does undermine the importance of the instrumental use of the knowledge gained
from value claims, for theories that do not recognize this importance make the
ontological and epistemological tenets regarding the importance of value claims a moot
point. Thus, the first criterion for determining whether a theory provides a democratic
process of decision-making is also an important criterion for determining the internal
coherence of the three theories being examined here.
Based on the discussion regarding the challenge of providing a democratic process of
decision-making, we can conclude that both Yanow and Fischer provide internally
coherent theories of policy analysis. As discussed, Yanow fulfills the criterion of
incorporating a democratic process of decision-making that allows for an adequately
well-informed decision to be made. She does this through her method of mapping the
architecture of discourse relevant to the policy issue. By doing so, she provides the
decision-maker(s) with adequate knowledge of the various perspectives within the policy
discourse; knowledge that the decision-maker(s) can use to make an adequately well
informed decision.
Also based on the prior diseussions, Fischer is able to provide an internally coherent
theory o f policy analysis. He provides a theory of policy analysis structured around four
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levels of discourse. Through his final three levels of discourse, Fischer fulfills all three
criteria for determining whether a theory successfully incorporates a democratic process
of decision-making. By recognizing within these three levels of diseourse the possibility
of alternative interpretations, meanings, and values, and by providing a space for each
perspective not only to be heard, but also to discuss their various perspectives and to
come to a consensus or a decision, Fischer not only provides us with a method of policy
analysis that is internally coherent, but also provides a theory that is truly democratic.
Also based on prior discussions, we can conclude that Stone’s theory of policy
analysis is an internally incoherent theory. Although she upholds the ontological and
epistemological tenets that policy analysis is value-laden, she fails to recognize the
implications of these tenets to her methods because she fails to incorporate a democratic
process of decision-making within her theory of policy analysis that provides for an
adequately well-informed decision. This leads to a method of policy analysis that,
although recognizes the fact that the objects of inquiry for policy analysis is value-laden;
thus the nature of policy analysis itself, makes this recognition a moot point. Thus, Stone
fails to provide an internally coherent theory.

The Challenge of Policy Analysis as Ideology
The last criticism of positivist policy analysis that this thesis will address is the
criticisms that when positivist policy analysis enters into the policy discourse, it does so
as an ideological position rooted in specific value claims that entail specific values,
meanings, and interpretations. According to Fay, this is due to the fact that: (1) positivist
theories are products of modem industrial society and thus reflect the rationale of modem
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industrial society; (2) that the values they implicitly instill are those not only of modem
industrial society, but also those of the dominant class of society; and (3) that by
reflecting the values of the dominant class of society, (4) they reify the basic social
institutions and customs of society. Yet, the problem with the ideological character of
positivist policy analysis is not necessarily that it reflects a certain ideology, but more so
that it conceals the fact that it reflects a specific ideological position because it reports its
findings as non-ideological. This problem stems from the positivist tenet that knowledge
is ‘objective’ in regards to the tmth of the statement. The positivist policy analyst claims
that the product of their analysis is tme, regardless of any ideological perspective. Thus,
the challenge for the three theories of the hermeneutic critique is to be able to provide a
theory that resolves this problem of the ideological character of policy analysis.
Yanow, Stone, and Fischer all address this issue. For Yanow’s theory, the process of
mapping the architecture of the policy discourse resolves the challenge presented by the
positivist’s problem of the ideological character of poliey analysis. By doing so, her
theory reveals the underlying framework that makes sense of human artifacts, and
inquires into the various value claims held by each community of meaning. Stone and
Fischer also address the challenge presented by the positivist’s problem of the ideological
character of policy analysis. They, like Yanow, make the ideological character of policy
analysis explicit hy revealing the underlining principles that entail various interpretations,
meanings, and values held by the various communities of meaning, stakeholders, or
alternative analyses. For Stone, this is done not only through the deconstructive process
of revealing the various ideas behind alternative policy analyses, but also during the
process of constructing one’s own policy alternative. In the construction of one’s own
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policy alternative, the analyst is to use various ideas as a foundation for their policy
position. Thus, they explicitly reveal their ideological position when they formulate
arguments on behalf of their policy alternative and when criticizing alternative policy
perspectives.
For Fischer, the ideologies of specific policy alternatives are explicated within his
final level of ideological discourse, through the process of social choice. Although this
process, according to Fischer, is to be generally undertaken by the political philosopher,
he notes that for the policy analyst it is important to “show the ways in which policy
analysis is already set in the context of ideological questions and that policy analysts
must at minimum be acknowledged consumers of the products of political-philosophical
analysis.”'^
Thus, although policy analysis still reflects the ideologies held by the various
communities of meaning, stakeholders, or policy alternatives, all three theories are
successful in overcoming the challenge of policy analysis as ideology because they
explicitly reveal the various underlying ideological assumptions. Again, the major
criticism, as noted above, that leads to the challenge of policy analysis as ideology was
not that positivist theories of poliey analysis were embedded in an underlying ideological
framework, but more so that they denied the ideological nature of their analysis. Unlike
positivist theories of policy analysis, the three theories presented do not claim that the
resulting analysis is non-ideological, instead they admit to the ideological nature of the
resulting analysis. Not only this, but they also explicate the various ideological
principles, frames, or ideas underlining the resulting analysis. By doing so, each theory
19

Fischer, Evaluating Public Policy, 172.
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successfully resolves the challenge presented by the criticism of positivist policy analysis
as ideology.

Summary
In this chapter, the three theories of representing the three perspectives of the
hermeneutic critique were evaluated in terms of whether they were able to overcome
some of the challenges presented by the criticisms of the general positivist paradigm for
policy analysis, and its resulting theories. From the evaluations, we were able to
conclude that only Fischer’s theory was able to fully overcome all four of the challenges
discussed. Stone’s theory was unable to overcome not only the challenge of providing a
democratic process of decision-making, but also the challenge of providing an internally
coherent theory.
Stone’s theory was unable to fulfill all three of the criteria presented for determining
whether a theory is able to provide for a democratic process of decision-making. Her
failure to provide a democratic process of decision-making, specifically the failure to
fulfill the first criterion of providing a process of decision-making that allows for an
adequately well informed decision to be made, also led to her theory’s inability to
overcome the challenge of providing an internally coherent theory. As noted, the internal
coherence of a postpositivist theory of policy analysis lies in its ability to provide a
method of policy analysis that uses the knowledge gained from value claims in a way that
realizes the importance of this knowledge, which had been established by the denial of
the ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value dichotomy. The failure to do
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so makes the denial of the ontological and epistemological tenets of a fact-value
dichotomy a moot point.
Yanow’s theory was unable to fully overcome the challenge of providing a
democratic process of decision making because her theory failed to provide communities
of meaning effective roles within the decision-making process. Thus, her theory was
unable to fulfill the two criteria of providing a process of decision-making that reflects
the consent of the governed or accommodates the right of the citizen to participate in the
decision-making process, and one which helps to legitimize the process of policy
development and implementation as democratic. Yet, unlike Stone’s theory, Yanow’s
theory was still able to overcome the challenge of providing an internally coherent
theory. This was specifically due to her theory’s incorporation of a process of decision
making that allowed for an adequately well-informed decision to be made. Thus,
although her theory may be inadequate in comparison to theories that are able to fulfill all
three criteria of providing a democratic process of decision-making, such as Fischer’s,
her theory may still be more viable than Stone’s theory or positivist theories of policy
analysis.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION
Summary of Chapters
In Chapter I, I introduced a brief history of policy analysis. In the broad sense of a
scientific revolution, this chapter introduced a brief history of how the positivist
paradigm came to be the dominant paradigm within policy analysis, and of how it
established a time of normal science for policy analysis. We learned that policy analysis
traces back to the ancient times of the Babylonians, ancient Hebrews, Egyptians, as well
as ancient groups in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. We also learned that policy
analysis had a long history of philosophical, political, historical, and social influences.
One major influenee was Harold Lasswell, deemed the “Modem Day Founder of Policy
Science.” According to Garson, Laswell presented an “optimistic vision of the
possibilities of behavioral methods to serve humanistic ends.”* As policy analysis
continued to evolve from LaswelTs vision, policy analysis became divided into two
generally distinct theoretical camps - positivist and postpositivist policy analysis. In the
1970’s policy analysis in general enjoyed tremendous growth, and during these times, the
p o sitiv ist paradigm b eca m e the dom inant paradigm for p o lic y an alysis.

In Chapter II, we first looked at the various tenets held by the general positivist
paradigm for policy analysis. We saw how the positivist paradigm held the ontological

* Garson, 6.
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tenet of the fact-value dichotomy, which led them to the epistemological tenet of the factvalue dichotomy that is rooted in the verification criterion of meaning. This led positivist
theories of policy analysis to conclude that knowledge was centered on understanding the
universal social laws that may eventually allow one, and society, to control his or her
social environment. These tenets, along with the positivist’s tenet of the unity of science,
led to methodological tenets that provided a framework for policy analysis that was
thought to be analogous to the methods of natural science - the framework of rational
decision-making. This framework treats values as given by the decision-maker(s),
reducible to quantitative analysis, and presupposes that empirical evidence along with the
criterion of efficiency can lead to the determination of the ‘best’ policy alternative.
We also came to understand, given the criticisms of Fay, and later the criticisms of
Yanow, Stone, and Fischer, how the tenets of the positivist paradigm for policy analysis
failed to take into consideration the value-laden nature of policy analysis. Moreover,
regardless of its claim to be able to provide a value-neutral policy analysis, we learned
that positivist policy analysis was a political argument—an argument rooted in the
ideology of modem industrial society that, intentionally or not, reifies the practiees and
habits of society’s status quo, a status quo that sustains and legitimizes the dominant
powers over the oppressed. Thus, the positivist paradigm for policy analysis not only
failed to provide a value-neutral analysis, but it is inherently unable to do so.
These critieisms speak specifically of the positivist paradigm’s inability to make such
anomalies as competing values, interpretations, and meanings to be anticipated and
incorporated within its conception of policy analysis. In the broader sense of a scientific
revolution, these kinds of criticisms led to a period of crisis for the science of policy
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analysis, and led many theorists and practitioners to reject the dominant positivist
paradigm for alternative paradigms that were thought to be able to resolve these issues
that positivist paradigms were criticized as not being able to resolve. Thus, these kinds of
criticisms can also he understood as establishing the pivots on which scientific
revolutions turn.
These criticisms also presented specific challenges for alternative paradigms for
policy analysis, and their resulting theories. These challenges must be addressed if
alternative paradigms are to be able to provide viable alternative theories in contrast to
those provided by the dominant positivist paradigm. Thus, in Chapter III, I presented
three theories of policy analysis that represented what Morçôl referred to as the most
coherent theory stream amongst various postpositivist theories—the theory stream of the
hermeneutic critique. According to Morçôl, there are three distinguishable but
overlapping perspectives within the hermeneutic critique: the interpretive/hermeneutic
perspective, the discourse perspective, and the critical perspective. As a representative of
the interpretive/hermeneutic perspective, I offered a summary of Yanow’s interpretive
theory of policy analysis. As a representative of the discourse perspective, I offered a
summary of Stone’s theory of analysis as craft, and as a representative of the critical
perspective, I offered a summary of Fischer’s discursive theory of policy analysis.
As the summaries of each of these theories were presented, I also offered brief
comparisons of each of these theories. Much of the overlapping referred to by Morçôl
occurs within the ontological and epistemological tenets of the three theories, and their
use of hermeneutic methods. These overlaps can be attributed to the notion that all three
theories share a similar paradigm for policy analysis— a general postpositivist paradigm.
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Assuming an alternative paradigm to the general positivist paradigm for policy analysis,
all three theories deny the ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value
dichotomy, stressing the notion that value claims can yield knowledge.
Methodologically, due to their denial of the ontological and epistemological tenets of the
fact-value dichotomy, all three theories incorporate hermeneutic methods of inquiry, and
focus on quasi-causal modes of explanation of social phenomenon. In the broader view
of a scientific revolution, this chapter introduced an alternative paradigm to the positivist
paradigm, marking the end of crisis for the science of policy analysis.
From this point we moved on to Chapter IV, in which these three theories were
evaluated on whether they, founded upon the same general postpositivist paradigm, were
able to adequately overcome the challenges presented by the criticisms of the general
positivist paradigm, and its resulting theories. This chapter focused on four major
challenges for the general postpositivist paradigm, and its resulting theories. These
challenges were: (1) the challenge of overcoming the ontological and epistemological
tenets of the fact-value dichotomy, (2) the challenge of providing a democratic process of
decision-making within their method of poliey analysis, (3) the challenge of providing a
coherent theory of policy analysis, and (4) the challenge of resolving the problem of
policy analysis as ideology.
Within this discussion, we revealed the intimate relationship between the denial of the
ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value dichotomy and the need for
providing a democratic process of decision-making that allows for an adequately wellinformed decision. This relationship was rooted in the questions concerning the purpose
or instrumental use of the knowledge gained from value claims (from inquiry into various
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interpretations, values, and meanings), and from the epistemological tenet that knowledge
from value claims was most important for the analysis of policy. In this sense, the denial
of the ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value dichotomy entailed the
incorporation of a democratic process of decision-making that allowed for an adequately
well-informed decision.
One of the conclusions drawn from these diseussions was that only Fischer’s theory
was able to successfully overcome all four of the challenges presented by the criticisms
of the general positivist paradigm for policy analysis, and its resulting theories. The
reason for this is that only Fischer’s theory was able to fully overcome the challenge of
providing a democratic process of decision-making, while also overcoming the other
three challenges
Yanow’s theory was unable to overcome the challenge of providing a democratic
process of decision-making, while being able to overcome the other three challenges.
This was due to her theory’s failure to fulfill the last two criteria for determining whether
a theory provides a democratic process of decision-making: the criterion of ensuring that
the decision made reflects the consent of the governed, and the criterion of helping to
legitimate the process of decision-making as democratic. Although this was not
detrimental to the internal coherence of her theory, it may he detrimental to the likeliness
that her theory would be accepted as a viable alternative postpositivist theory in
comparison to other alternative postpositivist theories that do fulfill these two criteria.
Stone’s theory not only failed to overcome the challenge of providing a democratic
process of decision-making, but her theory’s inability to do so also led to its failure to
overcome the challenge of providing an internally coherent theory. By failing to provide
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for a democratic process of decision-making that allowed for an adequately wellinformed decision, Stone’s theory made the denial of the ontological and epistemological
tenets of the fact-value dichotomy a moot point. Her theory failed to hring the
ontological and epistemological tenets that value claims can produce knowledge to bear
important implications for her methods.
It is important to note here that although the three theories presented do share the
same general paradigm, this does not mean that the rationalization of the paradigmatic
tenets would be the same. As Kuhn notes, “The determination of shared paradigms is not
however the determination of shared rules”,’ and as he continues to explain, “[Scientists]
can, that is, agree in their identification of a paradigm, without agreeing on, or even
attempting to produce, a full interpretation or rationalization of it.”^ Thus, thé failures of
Yanow’s and Stone’s theories to overcome all of the challenges presented by the
criticisms of positivist theories of policy analysis, may not warrant one to reject the
paradigm they use. Instead, it would warrant one to reject Yanow’s and Stone’s
interpretation or rationalization of that paradigm.
Also, the fact that Fischer was able to overcome all of the challenges presented by the
criticisms of positivist policy analysis, may not only suggest the possibility of accepting
his rationalization of the general paradigm that he shares with Yanow and Stone, but it
may also may suggest the possibility of accepting the paradigm itself as an adequate
alternative to the positivist paradigm for policy analysis.

’ Kuhn, 43.
Ibid., 44.
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Thesis Questions Answered
The primary research question for this thesis asked whether postpositivist theories of
policy analysis, specifically theories representing the three perspectives of the
hermeneutic critique, were viable alternatives to positivist theories of policy analysis.
This question involved questions as to whether (1) the theories, eaeh representing one of
the three perspectives of the hermeneutic critique, undertake to overcome the criticisms
that positivist theories have been charged. (2) If they did so adequately, then where was
this success located? In other words, was their success in overcoming the criticisms that
positivist theories have been charged with due specifically to paradigm shifts? (3) If not,
at what point did postpositivist theories also succumb to the criticisms faced by positivist
theories? And, (4) were these postpositivist theories subject to problems of their own,
possibly arising from their alternative paradigm? Yet, within this question, there was a
deeper question. Given that these three theories shared the same general paradigm for
policy analysis, this thesis was also asking; if postpositivist theories were successful in
overcoming the challenges presented by the criticisms of positivist theories, whether this
warranted us to reject the positivist paradigm for the general postpositivist paradigm?
It is clear from the summaries of the three theories presented in Chapter III that the
three theories representing the three perspectives of policy analysis do undertake the task
of overcoming the criticisms that positivist theories have been charged with. Not only
this but in Chapter IV, we evaluated whether or not these three theories were in fact able
to overcome the challenges presented by the criticism of positivist theories of policy
analysis. We concluded that only Fischer’s interpretive theory was able to overcome all
four of the challenges presented by the criticisms of positivist theories. Yanow’s and
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Stone’s theories failed to overcome either one or two of the challenges, respectively. In
comparison, we can establish that the success of Fischer’s theory is primarily located in
its incorporation of a fully democratic process of decision-making.
This incorporation of a democratic process of decision-making, specifically in that it
provides for an adequately well-informed decision, although being a shorteoming of
positivist theories as well, was a significant flaw in Stone’s theory; a flaw that points to a
crucial aspect of not only her theory, but also of postpositivist theories in general. This
crucial aspect is that in order to provide an internally coherent theory of policy analysis,
postpositivist theories that deny the positivist’s ontological and epistemological tenets of
the fact-value dichotomy, and thereby maintain that policy analysis is a value-laden
enterprise, must incorporate a democratic process of deeision-making that provides for an
adequately well-informed decision within their methods. Thus, Stone’s theory is not a
viable alternative for policy analysis, although Fischer’s and Yanow’s theories may be.
This is a problem that is specifically oriented towards postpositivist theories of policy
analysis when understood as a problem of internal coherence, since it is only within the
general postpositivist paradigm where tenets regarding the value-laden nature of policy
analysis are held—especially the tenet regarding the importance of inquiring into value
claims, which entail various values, interpretations, and meanings.
Yanow’s theory, although being unable to fully overcome the challenge of providing
a democratic process of decision-making, was able to provide for a democratic process of
decision-making that allowed for an adequately well-informed decision. By doing so, she
was also able to provide an internally coherent theory. Therefore, it can be said that her
theory may be a viable alternative to positivist theories. Yet, because she fails to fully
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overcome the challenge of providing a democratic process of decision-making, her theory
may not be a viable alternative in comparison to postpositivist theories that are able to do
so.
As mentioned in the prior section, although Yanow’s and Stone’s theories failed to
overcome all four of the challenges presented by the criticisms of positivist theories of
policy analysis, this is not sufficient proof that the general paradigm they use is not a
viable alternative to the positivist paradigm of policy analysis. It may be that the failures
are not a result of their paradigmatic tenets, but more so due to the interpretations or
rationalizations of these tenets. In comparing Fischer’s theory against Yanow’s and
Stone’s theories, this seems to be the case.
In addition, the success of Fischer’s theory of policy analysis may also indicate that
the general paradigm that he shares with Yanow and Stone is a viable alternative to the
positivist paradigm of policy analysis. Given the proper interpretation or rationalization
of these paradigmatic tenets, the general postpositivist paradigm may be able to produce a
theory of policy analysis that is more viable than those theories produced hy the general
positivist paradigm.

Recommendations
The recommendations listed below are recommendations regarding the formulation of
adequate theories of policy analysis. These reeommendations are products of the
evaluative diseussions that occurred in Chapter IV, and the answering of the major thesis
question in the above sections. They crystallize the lessons learned from this thesis.
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1. The Adoption of a General Postpositivist
Paradigm
The first recommendation for formulating adequate theories of policy analysis is that
theories of policy analysis ought to formulate their theories upon the general
postpositivist paradigm; upon the tenets denying the ontological and epistemological
tenets of the fact-value dichotomy, the denial of the positivist’s version of the unity of
science, and the adoption of hermeneutic methods that result in quasi-causal modes of
explanation. This recommendation is supported not only by the success of Fischer’s
theory in overcoming the challenges presented by the criticisms of the positivist
paradigm, but also by the positivist paradigm’s inability to overcome these challenges.
This shift in ontological, epistemological, and methodological tenets—or in
paradigms—is necessitated by the positivist paradigm’s inability to incorporate or
address value claims that entail multiple interpretations, meanings, and values inherent
within policy analysis. As noted in Chapter II, the realization that the objects of policy
analysis are inherently value-laden, for the positivist paradigm for policy analysis, is
likened to the discovery of anomalies before scientific revolutions. These anomalies that
positivist paradigms are unable to provide accounts, also referred to by Kuhn as
epistemologieal counter-instances, “permit the emergence of a new and different analysis
of science within which they are no longer a source of trouble.”"*
In policy analysis, this new and different analysis seems to be framed according to the
general postpositivist paradigm used by all three theories representing the three
perspectives o f the hermeneutic critique. Furthermore, as Kuhn continues, “From a new

Ibid., 78; Ibid.
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theory of scientific knowledge, [the epistemological counter-instances] may seem very
much like tautologies, statements of situations that could not conceivably have been
otherwise.”^ This is very much the case for the alternative postpositivist paradigm;
understood within the postpositivist paradigm, the notion of policy analysis as value
laden could not conceivably have been otherwise.
2. The Importance of a Democratic Process
of Decision-Making
Second, in the interpretation or rationalization of the general tenets of the general
postpositivist paradigm—the formulation of a theory—it is recommended that theorists
pay close attention to providing a democratic process of decision-making, especially in
providing a democratic process of decision-making that allows for an adequately wellinformed decision to be made. The failure of Stone’s theory in overcoming the challenge
of providing an internally coherent theory of policy analysis was located specifically in
her theory’s inability to overcome the challenge of providing a democratic process of
decision-making that allows for an adequately well-informed decisions to be made.
I am not assuming that theorists have been overlooking the importance of providing a
democratic process of decision-making, for there are numerous authors that address the
importance of democracy to policy analysis. What I am doing is simply highlighting the
point that the epistemological denial of the fact-value dichotomy entails that a theory of
policy analysis provide a method of democratic decision-making that provides for a more
informed decision, and that not doing so would result in an internally incoherent theory.

Ibid.
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It is also important that the last two criteria for providing a democratic process of
decision-making be fulfilled, if a postpositivist theory wishes to be competitive with
other postpositivist theories. As we have seen with Yanow’s theory, simply providing a
theory that fulfills the first criterion, although resulting in an internally coherent theory,
does not make the theory a viable alternative to postpositivist theories of policy analysis
that also fulfill that last two criteria. Much of the literature in policy analysis, speaks of
the importance of a democratic process of decision-making that ensures that the decision
made by the decision-maker(s) reflects the consent of the governed, and legitimizes the
process of decision-making as democratic. Thus, a theory of policy analysis that only
provides a method of democratic decision-making that leads to an adequately wellinformed decision is not sufficient for it to be accepted as a viable alternative to
postpositivist theories that are able to fulfill all three of the criteria for providing a
democratic process of decision-making. It must provide stakeholders or communities of
meaning an actual effective role in the decision-making process, and contribute to
ensuring the process of decision-making as legitimate.
3. The Problem with Pluralist’s Assumptions
of Democracy
A third recommendation, also derived from the discussion regarding the challenge of
providing a democratic process of decision-making, is that theorists ought to be critical of
pluralist assumptions when formulating their theories. As we have seen in Chapter IV,
the failure of Stone’s theory in overcoming the three challenges mentioned, was primarily
due to her assumption of a pluralist democracy. And, as the criticisms of Lowi, and
Ingram and Schneider, have shown, the assumptions of pluralist’s notions of democracy
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are flawed. It is not true that the forum or process of discourse in current democracies,
such as the United States, is ideally democratic, especially because information and
power are unequally distributed. Thus the reliance on the pluralist’s conceptions of
democracy, when formulating a theory of policy analysis, is not advised.
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